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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On the July day in 2010 that President Barack Obama signed into 
law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Act”),1 he paused to recognize the challenges that 
had been overcome to pass the new law in the wake of the greatest 
financial crisis since the Great Depression.2  In his remarks, he stated that 
“[p]assing this bill was no easy task.  To get there, we had to overcome 
the furious lobbying of an array of powerful interest groups and a partisan 
minority determined to block change.”3  The final act of signing the 
legislation into law was the result of over a year of activity to enact “a 
sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation 
on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the Great 
Depression.”4 
The new law was the product of a concerted effort to address the 
many causes of the recent financial crisis and to put in place protections 
against similar future crises.  It also was the embodiment of the famous 
admonition of Rahm Emanuel, then-White House Chief of Staff, that, 
“[y]ou never want a serious crisis to go to waste.”5  Yet even in that 
moment of celebration there was clearly a recognition that while one 
 
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2. See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by President at Signing of Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) [hereinafter Obama, 
Statement at Signing of Dodd-Frank], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-
act [https://perma.cc/295C-RVSD]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial 
Reform (June 17, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-regulatory-reform/ [https://perma.cc/9X66-33WN]. 
 5. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 21, 2008, 12:01 
AM),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271 [https://perma.cc/YXW9-
VWGX] (quoting Rahm Emanuel).  Although this quote has over time has come to be used 
as an example of gross political expediency, the full discussion in context was more 
bipartisan.  Emanuel went on to say: 
 
And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you 
could not do before. . . .  This crisis provides the opportunity, for us, as I 
would say, the opportunity to do things that you could not do before.  The 
good news, I suppose, if you want to see a silver lining, is the problems 
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phase of financial reform was over, another was just beginning.  President 
Obama said: “Now, it doesn’t mean our work is over.  For these new rules 
to be effective, regulators will have to be vigilant.”6 
The President’s comments were prescient, as even then, 
opponents of the new law were organizing and strategizing their next 
steps.  As one prominent Washington financial lobbyist said: “[T]he 
signing of Dodd-Frank last July represented ‘halftime’ in the debate.  
Now opponents must fight a two-front war that has them trying to 
persuade elected officials to rethink decisions while influencing the 
regulators whose job it is to implement Dodd-Frank.”7  However, the 
declaration of a two-front war did not begin to describe the scope of the 
brewing opposition effort.  The attacks against the Dodd-Frank Act 
would not be limited to efforts to persuade Congress or to influence 
regulators.  As Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner, said after 
eighteen months of implementing the Act:  
 
The forces working against reform are trying a range of 
different strategies, including blocking appointments of 
new leadership to key oversight positions, cutting 
funding, policy riders on appropriations bills, new 
legislation to repeal the entire law or just critical pieces 
of it, efforts to use cost-benefit analysis as roadblocks to 
reform, and other efforts to slow the pace of 
implementation of regulation in the hopes of watering it 
down.8 
 
This Article documents and analyzes several ways in which the 
Dodd-Frank Act has been challenged over the past decade.  Part II briefly 
discusses the ongoing lobbying efforts in both Congress and at the 
regulatory agencies to affect the implementation of the Act.9  Part III 
analyzes some of the key litigation that shaped the rulemaking under the 
 
 6. Obama, Statement at Signing of Dodd-Frank, supra note 2. 
 7. Gary Rivlin, The Billion Dollar Bank Heist, NEWSWEEK (July 11, 2011, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/billion-dollar-bank-heist-68427 [https://perma.cc/7JQS-RKJK] 
(referring to Scott Talbott, then-Head of Government Affairs at the Financial Services 
Roundtable). 
 8. Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at The 
Macroprudential Toolkit: Measurement and Analysis Conference (Dec. 1, 2011), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1371.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7HGX-ZKDT]. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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Act.10  Part IV discusses the legislative actions undertaken to amend the 
Act.11  Part V concludes by identifying remaining challenges to 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.12 
II.  LOBBYING 
Recognizing the broad impact that financial reform legislation 
would have on the financial industry if it became law, large amounts of 
money were spent by opponents of reform on lobbying to influence the 
Dodd-Frank bill as it moved through Congress.  At the height of the 
debate on the bill during the summer of 2010, the banks spent $27.3 
million over just three months to influence the outcome.13  Yet, the bill’s 
final outcome—with its many provisions placing restrictions on the 
operations of large financial institutions,14 such as the Volcker Rule15—
begs the question of how much value that the industry received for its 
money.   
With the debate surrounding the Dodd-Frank Act’s passage 
following so closely after the financial crisis and the passage of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200816 which established the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), big banks were severely 
hindered by a toxic public reputation in their efforts to lobby Congress.  
As House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank remarked: 
“Beginning with TARP, they lost influence . . . .  They substantially lost 
influence over the legislative process when Lehman Brothers collapsed 
 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. Pat Garofalo, Wall Street Spending as Much to Undermine Dodd-Frank Regulations 




 14. Provisions in the bill opposed by large financial institutions included the Volker Rule, 
living wills, enhanced capital requirements, the swaps pushout rule, and the creation of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). 
 15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2018).  The Volcker Rule generally prohibits any banking entity from 
engaging in proprietary trading or from retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or 
having certain relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund.  See id. 
 16. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
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and the crisis hit, and they never regained it.”17  The damage to the 
reputations of the largest financial institutions that began with the 
financial crisis persists to this day.  As one financial industry lobbyist 
said: “Our reputation took quite a hit.”18  He went on to contrast pre-crisis 
lobbying with lobbying today stating that: “In those days, we’re taking 
one or two office visits to convince a lawmaker.  Now sometimes it runs 
on three to four years.  That may [still not] get done.”19  A 2016 poll 
found that 58% of those polled believed that Wall Street does more to 
harm the lives of Americans than help.20   
At the same time, the influence of community banks—who 
consistently pointed out to Capitol Hill and the media that they had not 
been the cause of the financial crisis or received government bailouts—
increased markedly in Congress and among the public.21  Given the 
challenges to their ability to directly influence legislation because of their 
political unpopularity, the large financial institutions adopted strategies 
to project their influence in less direct and public ways.  “Their influence 
in Congress was greatest when they could make their case quietly, out of 
public view.”22  Instead of advocating directly, they started to use 
community institutions “as the point of the spear on their lobbying efforts 
. . . essentially using small-bank legislation as a vehicle for large-bank 
provisions.”23   
The large banks, nevertheless, also continued to make campaign 
contributions to try to ensure that their voices were heard.  Over the last 
four election cycles since passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate industries have contributed over $1.2 
billion to the Republican Party and its candidates directly, and 
 
 17. Victoria Finkel, The Crisis isn’t Over, AM. BANKER (July 29, 2018), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-crisis-isnt-over [https://perma.cc/Y7VT-
SAWT]. 
 18. Sylvan Lane, Pushing for Change for Banks, HILL (July 12, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/454223-pushing-for-change-for-banks 
[https://perma.cc/ZMW4-D28Q]. 
 19. Id. (alteration in original). 
 20. Nancy Marshall-Genzer, Why Americans Feel the Economy is Rigged, 
MARKETPLACE (June 29, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/06/29/why-americans-
feel-economy-rigged/ [https://perma.cc/6BPD-DJZ2]. 
 21. Finkel, supra note 17. 
 22. ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION 
WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T 83 (Vintage Books, 1st ed. 2014) (2013). 
 23. Finkel, supra note 17. 
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approximately $853 million to Democrats.24  The results of their post-
Dodd-Frank Act legislative efforts are discussed in Part IV of this 
Article.25 
While continuing to lobby Congress and contribute to campaigns 
in the hope of influencing legislation, the large financial institutions also 
shifted their efforts to the less public and more obscure battlefields of the 
regulatory agencies and the courts.  Although a huge piece of legislation 
at 849 pages, the Dodd-Frank Act is far broader in its construction than it 
is deep.  Covering topics from systemic risk to large bank resolution to 
derivatives to the regulation of credit rating agencies, the Act has sixteen 
titles and numerous subtitles.  However, in many areas, the Act provides 
only broad authority or general direction, often relying on rulemaking by 
the regulatory agencies to fill the legislative voids.  According to one law 
firm tracking the Dodd-Frank Act’s implementation, the agencies were 
required to implement 390 rulemaking requirements.26   
The extensive rulemaking required to implement the Dodd-Frank 
Act provided many opportunities for interested parties to influence the 
rulemaking process, and the financial industry immediately directed its 
best legal talent and substantial resources at this critical aspect of the 
law’s implementation.  Through the first five years of implementation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, the financial industry reported spending over $2.08 
billion for lobbying expenses, much of it to influence federal agencies 
rather than Congress.27  The financial regulatory agencies foresaw the 
coming onslaught and determined that public disclosure might provide 
some degree of insulation from the industry’s aggressive lobbying.  Very 
early in the rulemaking process, the regulatory agencies announced that 
they intended to go beyond the public notice requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)28 by publishing logs of their 
private meetings with interested parties on their websites to ensure public 
 
 24. Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG: CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?ind=F [https://perma.cc/BZ5N-6VZA] 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
 25. See infra Part IV (discussing legislative efforts against Dodd-Frank). 
 26. ANNETTE L. NAZARETH, GABRIEL D. ROSENBERG & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, DAVIS 
POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK’S SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.finregreform.com/?s=dodd-frank [https://perma.cc/69TS-XNEF]. 
 27. Alan Pyke, 5 Numbers to Know as Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Celebrates Its 
5th Birthday, THINKPROGRESS (July 21, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/5-
numbers-to-know-as-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-celebrates-its-5th-birthday-
e145f4360b7c/ [https://perma.cc/9WU4-EGUU]. 
 28. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
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transparency.29  These sites provide an illuminating window into the 
financial industry’s activities directed at the regulatory agencies.30 
The lobbying effort dedicated to the rulemaking process took on 
many forms.  In some cases, lobbyists and law firms organized and 
divided up responsibilities for the rulemaking process.   
 
After Dodd-Frank’s passage, lobbyists for the big 
banks and industry trade groups divided themselves into 
eighteen working groups, each organized around a 
different element of the new law. . . .  One working group 
focused on derivatives reform, including the requirement 
that these complex financial instruments now be sold on 
open exchanges in the fashion of stocks and bonds.  
Another focused on efforts to hammer out the so-called 
Volcker Rule, which would limit the ability of federally 
insured banks to wager on risky ventures.  A third tackled 
the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
created to protect ordinary consumers from Wall Street 
 
 29. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Release No. 187-2010, FDIC Announces 
Open Door Policy for Regulatory Reform Rulemaking (Aug. 12, 2010), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10187.html [https://perma.cc/7KC9-DR4H] 
(announcing FDIC will release the names and affiliations of private sector individuals who 
meet with senior FDIC officials to discuss implementing the new law and the subject matter 
of those meetings); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Release No. 2010-135, SEC 
Chairman Schapiro Announces Open Process for Regulatory Reform Rulemaking (July 27, 
2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-135.htm [https://perma.cc/N9KN-7UTJ] 
(“[SEC staff] will follow newly-established best practices when holding meetings with 
interested parties in order to ensure full transparency to the public.”); Communications With 
the Public, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/communications-with-public.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5DVG-DCJ5] (last updated Feb. 14, 2011) (stating Federal Reserve “will be 
involved in many rulemakings to implement” Dodd-Frank Act and that “[d]uring the 
rulemaking process, meetings will take place between the [Federal Reserve],” the public, and 
representatives from banking organizations, and noting that contacts and summaries of 
meetings will be posted on webpage). 
 30. See, e.g., Private Sector Meetings on Financial Reform, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/meetings/ [https://perma.cc/3SA6-GHDB] (last updated 
July 8, 2019); Regulatory Reform: Communications with the Public, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/communications-with-
public.htm [https://perma.cc/5WGW-KB9K] (last updated Feb. 14, 2011); Public Comments 
on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regreformcomments.shtml [https://perma.cc/23NE-3HZ4] 
(last updated June 21, 2016). 
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deceptions involving mortgages, credit cards and other 
major profit centers for the banks.31 
 
Those firms with special expertise or client interest focused on 
specific issues rather than attempting to comment on all issues that might 
be of interest or importance.  This provided an efficient and targeted use 
of lobbying resources across a broad spectrum of rules and agencies. 
With the incredible resources available to it, the financial industry 
was able to approach Congress, regulators, the courts, and the media with 
overwhelming force.  Lobbyists for financial interests outnumbered those 
representing consumer protection interests on Capitol Hill by as much as 
twenty-to-one.32  Like any successful army, the lobbying force was 
strongly supported by additional resources intended to magnify its 
impact.  “The lobbyists are just the point of the spear . . . .  There are also 
the regulatory lawyers, the research staffs, the PR people and all those 
loyal think tank supporters shilling for the banks.”33 
These industry resources were unleashed to meet with the 
political leadership and senior professional staff at the regulatory 
agencies to try to influence the rule writing process.  Following the 
publication of proposed rules, interested stakeholders also hired lobbyists 
and lawyers to prepare extensive comment letters.  Depending on the 
underlying issue, these comment letters were often lengthy and addressed 
highly complex areas of the proposed regulation.  The letters frequently 
were not only intended to provide comment on the proposal at hand, but 
also to lay the groundwork for a potential legal challenge once the 
regulation was finalized.  The impact of this strategy is discussed in 
greater detail in Part III of this Article.34 
The complexity of many of the proposed rules and the importance 
of the public comment process also caused many law and lobbying firms 
to engage in a search for talent to ensure that they could provide their 
clients with effective representation.  Firms sought to hire congressional 
and agency staff who had been involved with the passage of the Dodd-
 
 31. Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-Frank, NATION (May 20, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-wall-street-defanged-dodd-frank/ 
[https://perma.cc/LP2S-Q5PE]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (quoting Ed Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Programs, U.S. Public Interest 
Research Group (“PIRG”)). 
 34. See infra Part III. 
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Frank Act to draw on their expertise.35  The impact of this “revolving 
door” where individuals move between regulators and the financial 
industry and vice versa has been the subject of considerable analysis 
reaching often differing conclusions.  Critics of the revolving door often 
focus on the resulting quid pro quo, risk of regulatory capture, or 
reputational impacts of former government officials seeking to influence 
their colleagues.36  Others see a more benign but similarly influential 
impact of “regulatory schooling” where regulators and industry 
participants provide a transfer of knowledge and expertise as they move 
between the public and private sector.37  In either case, proponents of both 
schools of thought agree that there are ways to limit any negative effects 
 
 35. Jeff Stein, Many Lawmakers and Aides Who Crafted Financial Regulations After the 





 36. See, e.g., Elise S. Brezis & Joël Cariolle, Chapter 3: Financial Sector Regulation and 
the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks, in STATE, INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 53–76 (Springer Int’l Pub., Norman Schofield & 
Gonzalo Caballero eds., 2016) (“The distortive effects of the revolving door stem from the 
concentration of former regulators in a small number of firms.”); Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, 
How to Break the Wall Street to Washington Merry-Go-Round, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 10, 
2015, 11:07 AM),  https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/10/wall-street-to-washington-and-
back-again-bernanke-revolving-door-federal-reserve/ [https://perma.cc/T4HQ-Q7BE] (“The 
revolving door isn’t just unseemly — it’s dangerous.”); Lee Reiners, The Problems with 
Crypto’s Revolving Door, AM. BANKER (Oct. 25, 2018, 11:13 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the-problems-with-cryptos-revolving-door 
[https://perma.cc/8RQE-LZWU] (“A more concerning motive for tapping former regulators 
as advisers and directors, is that it lends an aura of legitimacy to a product and industry that 
may not be legitimate.”); Lisa Gilbert, Reforming the Financial Services Revolving Door, 
HILL, (July 15, 2015, 6:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/247962-
reforming-the-financial-services-revolving-door [https://perma.cc/9QE2-K2BF] (“[A] 
systemic corruption of government caused by the movement of high-level officials back and 
forth between government regulatory positions and the private sector to work in the industry 
they formerly regulated.”); Craig Holman, Opinion, A Matter of Trust — Slowing Wall 
Street’s Revolving Door, INSIDESOURCES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.insidesources.com/a-
matter-of-trust-slowing-wall-streets-revolving-door/ [https://perma.cc/5WHZ-3QEE] (“The 
revolving door between Wall Street and Washington once again threatens our nation’s 
financial health.”). 
 37. David Luca, Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, The Revolving Door and Worker Flows 
in Banking Regulation 4–5 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 20241, 2014), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20241 [https://perma.cc/X3A2-3RHX] (“These results appear 
inconsistent with a ‘quid-pro-quo’ explanation of the revolving door, but consistent with a 
‘regulatory schooling’ hypothesis.”); Brian Wallheimer, Should We Stop the ‘Revolving 
Door’?, CHI. BOOTH REV. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/public-
policy/2017/article/should-we-stop-revolving-door [https://perma.cc/95FT-V3YL] (“Some 
findings suggest that regulators are actually tougher on potential employers—and get hired 
because private-sector companies want to employ talented people who know the ins and outs 
of the regulatory system.”). 
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of the revolving door such as recusal requirements and “cooling off” 
periods.38 
Because government ethics rules generally limit contact with 
former colleagues and establish cooling off periods that significantly 
restrict former government officials,39 the regulatory schooling aspect of 
the revolving door seemed to be especially prevalent in the Dodd-Frank 
rulemaking process.  Without communicating with their prior agencies, 
former officials still provided knowledge to their new employers and 
clients on how to frame arguments to their prior agencies to provide the 
best chance of success in the rulemaking process.  Equally important, 
they possessed knowledge of what issues within the proposed rule most 
concerned the agencies regarding possible legal challenges.  This 
expertise was often invaluable in shaping comment letters requiring a 
detailed agency response in the final rulemaking that might provide the 
basis of a successful legal challenge. 
In the case of the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
sheer number of required regulatory actions created additional pressure 
on the rulemaking activities of the regulatory agencies.  As the agencies 
 
 38. See Larry D. Wall, The Revolving Door, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA: NOTES FROM 
VAULT (Jan. 2017), https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/01-the-
revolving-door-2017-01-30.aspx [https://perma.cc/K5TA-WVYH] (“[T]he approach taken to 
date has been to seek to mitigate the problem via a set of ethics rules, backed up by outside 
monitoring.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-118, LARGE BANK 
SUPERVISION: IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES COULD HELP 
MITIGATE THREATS TO INDEPENDENCE 10, passim (2017) (“The potential negative effects of 
capture on bank regulation and supervision requires well-designed preventative measures by 
prudential banking regulators.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-69, LARGE 
BANK SUPERVISION: OCC COULD BETTER ADDRESS RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 4, passim 
(2019) (“To respond to risks such as regulatory capture, . . . agencies should apply the 
principles of internal control through control activities, including policies and procedures.”). 
 39. Under 18 U.S.C. § 207, a former federal employee is barred from representing 
another person or entity by making a communication to or appearance before a Federal 
department, agency, or court concerning the same “particular matter . . . involving specific 
parties” (e.g., the same contract or grant) with which the former employee was involved while 
serving the Government.  18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2018).  If the matter was pending under the 
employee’s official responsibility during the employee’s last year of Government service, the 
bar lasts for two years.  Id. § 207(a)(2).  If the employee participated in the matter “personally 
and substantially,” the bar is permanent.  Id. § 207(a)(1). 
In addition, for a period of one year after leaving a “senior” position, a former senior employee 
may not represent another person or entity by making a communication to or appearing before 
the former employee’s former agency to seek official action on any matter.  Id. § 207(c).  A 
former “very senior” employee is subject to a similar prohibition, except that the bar lasts for 
two years and extends to contacts with specified high-level officials at any department or 
agency.  Id. § 207(d).  Separately, both former senior and very senior employees are prohibited 
for one year from representing, aiding, or advising a foreign government or foreign political 
party with the intent to influence certain Government officials.  Id. § 207(f). 
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strove to implement the requirements of the Act, their progress was 
constantly monitored and publicized.  Many of the rulemaking 
requirements in the Act were tied to specific deadlines for 
implementation that proved to be unrealistic.  When the agencies began 
missing their regulatory deadlines, the missed deadlines began to feed a 
narrative that the agencies were failing to do their jobs.40  To counter 
progress reports issued by private sources,41 some agencies began issuing 
their own reports on their rulemaking progress.42  Opponents of the 
Dodd-Frank Act seized on this reporting as proof that Congress had 
overreached and that the missed deadlines demonstrated that the Act was 
collapsing under its own weight.  This, in turn, invited congressional 
oversight targeted at the delays which affected the agencies’ ability to 
focus on the rulemaking as they diverted resources to draft responses to 
congressional inquiries, prepare for congressional testimony, and respond 
to congressional document requests. 
The direct and indirect pressure from various stakeholders and 
their lobbyists resulted in slow downs and additional complexity in the 
rulemaking that substantially delayed the implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act.  As former Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
Chairman Sheila Bair said: “This stuff doesn’t get any better with time 
. . . .  The longer you wait to finalize the rules, the more they get watered 
down, the more exceptions that get built in, people’s memories about the 
crisis start to fade and the pressure isn’t there.”43 
 
 40. See Kevin McCoy, Dodd-Frank Act: After 3 Years, a Long to-do List, USA TODAY 
(June 3, 2013, 8:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/03/dodd-
frank-financial-reform-progress/2377603/ [https://perma.cc/85WY-TG9X]; Kevin M. 
LaCroix, Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Delays: Bad, and Likely to Get Worse, LEXISNEXIS: LEGAL 
NEWSROOM (May 4, 2011), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/banking/b/banking-
finance/posts/dodd-frank-rulemaking-delays-bad-and-likely-to-get-worse 
[https://perma.cc/W5XV-WL3T]; Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, From Dodd-Frank to 
Dud: How Financial Reform May Be Going Wrong, PROPUBLICA (June 3, 2011, 8:16 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/from-dodd-frank-to-dud [https://perma.cc/B7J8-UN3E].  
In fact, one law firm issued a regular report tracking the rulemaking progress of the agencies, 
highlighting the number of missed deadlines and regulations that had yet to be proposed.  See 
Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, 
https://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report 
[https://perma.cc/W45H-CYGD] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank 
Progress Report, DAVIS POLK]. 
 41. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK, supra note 40 (highlighting 
agencies’ missed deadlines set by Dodd-Frank Act and regulations yet to be proposed). 
 42. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/N7DM-QDS9] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
 43. McCoy, supra note 40 (quoting Sheila Bair, former Chairman, FDIC). 
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III.  LITIGATION 
Given the extensive rulemaking required to implement the Dodd-
Frank Act and the high stakes for the financial and related industries, it is 
not surprising, and was probably inevitable, that opponents would adopt 
a litigation strategy.  The legal challenges ranged from the sufficiency of 
the economic analysis in agency rulemaking to the constitutionality of 
many of the Act’s provisions.  At every step, interested parties affected 
by the Act sought relief in the courts, culminating in a decade of litigation 
which not only established the parameters of the Dodd-Frank Act, but 
also spilled over into a host of other important legal areas.  
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis Challenges 
The rulemaking process was upended just months after the Act 
became law by a court decision involving a provision of the Dodd-Frank 
Act that arguably was tangential to its core provisions designed to address 
the causes of the financial crisis.  A year prior to passage of the Act, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) had 
decided by a three to two vote44 to propose a new rule45 that included 
 
changes to the federal proxy rules to remove impediments 
to the exercise of shareholders’ rights to nominate and 
elect directors to company boards of directors.  The new 
rules would require, under certain circumstances, a 
company to include in the company’s proxy materials a 
shareholder’s, or group of shareholders’, nominees for 
director.46   
 
The proposed rule was an attempt to address a long-standing debate about 
“proxy access.”47 
 
 44. Sara Hansard, SEC Commissioners Approve Proposal to Allow Shareholders to 
Nominate Directors, INVESTMENTNEWS (May 20, 2009), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/sec-commissioners-approve-proposal-to-allow-
shareholders-to-nominate-directors-21907 [https://perma.cc/3HSH-FRC8]. 
 45. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (proposed June 
18, 2009) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open 
Meeting on Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009mls.htm [https://perma.cc/6QDW-
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The two dissenting Commissioners questioned whether the SEC 
actually had the authority to make such a proposal.48  This expression of 
doubt about the SEC’s legal authority also was raised in public comment 
letters.49  A few months later, Congress included a specific provision in 
the Dodd-Frank Act—section 971—to address the issue of authority.50  
Section 971 of the Act provides that:  
 
The Commission may issue rules permitting the use by a 
shareholder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an 
issuer of securities for the purpose of nominating 
individuals to membership on the board of directors of the 
issuer, under such terms and conditions as the 
Commission determines are in the interests of 
shareholders and for the protection of investors.51   
 
With this clear grant of statutory authority, the SEC moved ahead 
on August 25, 2010, shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, to 
finalize the regulation, making it one of the first regulations promulgated 
under the new law.52  During the Commission’s discussion of the final 
 
UQRK] (“As observers of the Commission will know, this day has been a long time 
coming.”). 
 48. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting 
to Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 
2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009klc.htm [https://perma.cc/UPY4-
ZYCQ] (“[T]he Commission’s authority to enact these rules is subject to significant doubt 
. . .”); Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to 
Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 
2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm [https://perma.cc/56BR-
M2L6] (“The proposal, especially proposed Rule 14a–11 dictating a direct right of access to 
the company’s proxy materials, encroaches far too much on internal corporate affairs, the 
traditional domain of state corporate law.”). 
 49. Business Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations, at 5 (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
10-09/s71009-267.pdf [https://perma.cc/679D-BWXP] (“In conclusion, we believe that a 
federal proxy access right is unnecessary, has serious adverse consequences, and is beyond 
the Commission’s authority to adopt.”); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations, at 2 (Aug. 14, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-181.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TYF5-AY76] (“It is the judgment of the CCMC that the States, not the SEC, 
have the authority to act in this realm, through the traditional usage of state corporate law.”). 
 50. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
971(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78n note (2018). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668, 56669 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).  But see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 
1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating SEC Rule 14a–11). 
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rule, both dissenting Commissioners abandoned the argument that the 
Commission lacked the authority to promulgate the rule in light of the 
congressional action and instead were deeply critical of the economic 
analysis underlying the rule, questioning whether it adequately balanced 
the costs and benefits of the final rule and whether it fairly considered 
contrary analyses.53   
The criticism by the dissenting Commissioners of the economic 
analysis raised a particular red flag for the SEC.  Unlike the banking 
regulators that are not required to perform an economic analysis as part 
of their rulemaking, the SEC was statutorily required to consider a rule’s 
impact on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation (‘ECCF’).”54  
A string of cases55 had evolved such that courts had essentially held that 
Congress had imposed on “the SEC an obligation to consider the 
economic implications of certain rules it proposes”56 through this 
 
 53. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting 
to Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 
2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm [https://perma.cc/44GX-
V2VN] (“I am not satisfied that the Commission has seriously considered the true costs to 
issuers and our capital markets of imposing a new federal proxy access right, nor weighed 
these costs against the anticipated benefits, which appear to be speculative at best and to 
depend largely on the inestimable benefits of improved ‘investor confidence.’”); Troy A. 
Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt the Final 
Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (“Proxy Access”) (Aug. 25, 
2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.htm [https://perma.cc/DN89-
KV4K] (“To my mind, the adopting release’s treatment of the economic studies is not 
evenhanded.”). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018) (“Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission 
is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition 
to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”); § 78c(f) (“Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is engaged 
in rulemaking, or in the review of a rule of a self-regulatory organization, and is required to 
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the 
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”); § 78w(a)(2) (“The 
Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury, in making rules and regulations pursuant to 
any provisions of this chapter, shall consider among other matters the impact any such rule or 
regulation would have on competition.  The Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall not adopt any such rule or regulation which would impose a burden on competition not 
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.”); § 80a-2(c) 
(“Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is 
required to consider or determine whether an action is consistent with the public interest, the 
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”). 
 55. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber 
of Commerce v. SEC (Chamber II), 443 F.3d 890 (D.C Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. 
SEC (Chamber I), 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 56. E.g., Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 178. 
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statutory requirement.57  However, as one commenter pointed out, what 
constitutes the proper extent of 
 
consider[ation given to the] ECCF factors is a matter of 
judgment—one that can and should vary significantly 
depending upon the rule and its context.  No matter how 
much analysis the SEC undertakes, a court can always 
point to an additional issue that should have been 
analyzed, or analyzed differently or more deeply.58 
 
Just months after President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act 
into law, a panel of the D.C. Circuit issued a harsh opinion in Business 
Roundtable v. SEC,59 invalidating the SEC’s new proxy access rule (Rule 
14a–11)60 as “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA.61  The court 
found that “the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed 
the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain 
costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to 
support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond 
to substantial problems raised by commenters.”62  The panel went on to 
establish a seemingly new standard of review in determining that the SEC 
had failed to demonstrate that the proposed rule would result in a “net 
benefit.”63 
Although many commenters have criticized the decision and 
reasoning in Business Roundtable,64 it appeared to validate a narrative 
 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018). 
 58. Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 
YALE J. ON REG., 289, 303 (2013). 
 59. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 60. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56667, 56669 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 61. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pub. L. No. 79–404, §10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 
243–44 (1946). 
 62. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49.  Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, who wrote the 
decision, was a former Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
which is responsible for reviewing all rules promulgated by government agencies other than 
independent agencies, including their cost-benefit analyses. 
 63. Id. at 1153. 
 64. Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC 
Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2013) (“[T]he Business Roundtable decision 
was itself flawed.  In evaluating the SEC’s decision to adopt a proxy access rule, the D.C. 
Circuit completely disregarded the congressional policy judgments reflected in Dodd-
Frank.”); see also Kraus & Raso, supra note 58, at 303; Jonathan D. Guynn, The Political 
Economy of Financial Rulemaking After Business Roundtable, 99 VA. L. REV. 64 (2013); 
James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. 
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that opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act had been attempting to establish 
for several months.  At the first hearing on the implementation of the Act 
in February 2011, opponents expressed concern that, “[i]n the rush to 
comply with the unrealistic deadlines set in Dodd-Frank, the regulators 
have had to focus on speed rather than deliberation.”65  They argued that 
the speed of the process was undermining the integrity of the rulemaking 
and that this, along with the sheer number of rulemakings required by the 
Act, was stifling public participation.66 
Reflecting the views of the opponents, Senator Richard Shelby 
also argued that the rush to implement the rules under the Dodd-Frank 
Act was undermining the quality of the economic analysis essential to 
proper rulemaking: 
 
Another consequence of the hasty rulemaking 
process is that our regulators may not be properly 
conducting economic analysis of proposed rules.  Any 
thorough consideration of a proposed rule obviously 
should include an understanding of its cost.  
Unfortunately, there are serious questions regarding the 
willingness and ability of our regulators to conduct such 
an analysis.  In light of the fact that the cost imposed by 
these rules may cause some Americans to lose their jobs, 
our regulatory agencies should, at the very least, make 
themselves aware of the economic impact of proposed 
rules before adopting them.67 
 
With this opening shot, opponents served notice that they would 
attempt to wield economic analysis as a weapon in the ongoing 
implementation debate. 
However, not all of the financial regulators had similar 
requirements to perform cost-benefit analyses.  As previously mentioned, 
 
Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012); Recent 
Case, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088 
(2012). 
 65. Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: A Progress Report by the Regulators at 
the Half-Year Mark: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th 
Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg65718/pdf/CHRG-112shrg65718.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J8Z2-4TVD]. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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the SEC was required to consider efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation in its rulemaking,68 and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) had similar statutory requirements mandated by 
section 15(a) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 
1974,69 amending the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).70  In addition, 
the Dodd-Frank Act required the CFPB to consider the potential benefits 
and costs of its rulemakings.71  The Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) (hereinafter the 
“Federal Banking Regulators”) were not under similar statutory 
mandates.  Dodd-Frank opponents nevertheless frequently point to 
section 302 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act72 in attempting to argue that the Federal Banking 
Regulators are covered by an analogous statutory obligation.73 
Although not every agency charged with implementing the Dodd-
Frank Act had statutory obligations to conduct cost-benefit analyses, 
there were enough requirements for opponents of the Act to press the 
issue.  For instance, the House Agriculture Committee sent a request to 
 
 68. See supra note 54. 
 69. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 
(1974). 
 70. Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) § 15(a), 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2018) (“Before 
promulgating a regulation under this chapter . . . the Commission shall consider the costs and 
benefits of the action of the Commission.”). 
 71. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1022(b)(2)(a)(i), 12 U.S.C § 5512(b)(2)(a)(i) (2018) (“In prescribing a rule under the Federal 
consumer financial laws, the Bureau shall consider the potential benefits and costs to 
consumers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers to 
consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule . . . .”). 
 72. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
325, § 302, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4802). 
 73. Section 302 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement 
Act of 1994, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4802, provides that: 
 
In determining the effective date and administrative compliance 
requirements for new regulations that impose additional reporting, 
disclosure, or other requirements on insured depository institutions, each 
Federal banking agency shall consider, consistent with the principles of 
safety and soundness and the public interest—(1) any administrative 
burdens that such regulations would place on depository institutions, 
including small depository institutions and customers of depository 
institutions; and (2) the benefits of such regulations. 
 
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act § 302, 12 U.S.C. § 4802 
(2018) (emphasis added).  It is worth noting that, contrary to assertions that this statutory 
language creates a broad obligation for the federal banking agencies to conduct cost-benefit 
analyses for rulemakings, the introductory clause (emphasized above) makes clear that this 
requirement is specifically limited. 
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the CFTC Inspector General (“CFTC IG”) to review whether the CFTC 
had met the cost-benefit requirements of section 15(a) of the CEA in its 
promulgation of four new rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act.  The 
CFTC IG subsequently issued a report that was critical of the agency’s 
rulemaking process.74  The CFTC IG’s report found that “it appears the 
[CFTC] generally adopted a ‘one size fits all’ approach to section 15(a) 
compliance without giving significant regard to the deliberations 
addressing idiosyncratic cost and benefit issues that were shaping each 
rule, and were often addressed in the preamble.”75  The CFTC IG went 
on to find that “it appears that the economic factors considered and 
embraced or rejected during the course of constructing the rule were not 
included in the cost-benefit analysis, and instead the cost-benefit analysis 
was given an homogenized treatment.”76 
Shortly after the CFTC IG issued its report, the Republican 
Senators on the Senate Banking Committee jointly sent letters to the 
Inspectors General (“IG”) of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, SEC, and 
CFTC, asking them also to review the economic analyses performed by 
their respective agencies in proposing and adopting regulations under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.77  The IG responses were sent to the Senators in mid-
June 2011.  Although the IG reports found that “the agencies largely 
followed the statutory and other requirements applicable to their 
rulemaking and related economic analysis,”78 they formulated enough 
recommendations to provide additional ammunition for opponents.  One 
Senator stated:  
 
 
 74. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
AN INVESTIGATION REGARDING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT 
TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT: REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 21 (2011). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Mike Crapo, Senators: Are the Costs of Dodd-Frank Being Counted?: Banking 
Committee Republicans Ask Inspectors General to Review Economic Analysis, MIKE CRAPO: 
NEWSROOM/NEWS RELEASES (May 9, 2011), 
https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/senators-are-the-costs-of-dodd-frank-
being-countedd [https://perma.cc/VQ5E-N46B] (“The April Inspector General report raises a 
number of troubling issues with the cost benefit analysis being done by the CFTC and today 
we are requesting that the Inspectors General review the economic analyses performed by the 
Dodd-Frank regulators.”). 
 78. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT 
REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND 
COORDINATION 14 (2011). 
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The IG reports highlight the fact that there are no uniform 
cost-benefit requirements for our financial regulators that 
focus on economic growth, job creation, or 
competitiveness.  The regulators need to conduct rigorous 
analyses of the costs and benefits of their rules and the 
effects those rules could have on the economy.79 
 
Another Senator said that “[t]he [IG] reports deepened my 
concern that the regulatory agencies charged with implementing Dodd-
Frank are not undertaking the type of economic analysis that is necessary 
to reveal how Dodd-Frank will affect our economy.”80 
When the court decided Business Roundtable v. SEC81 a month 
later, it seemed to confirm the concerns expressed by Dodd-Frank Act 
opponents in Congress that the economic analysis backing the 
rulemaking was flawed.  Senator Richard Shelby, the Ranking Minority 
Member of the Senate Banking Committee argued: 
 
This decision is an unequivocal validation of the concerns 
that Republicans have raised repeatedly over the past 
year.  Our regulatory agencies are not undertaking 
rigorous and deliberate analysis to understand the 
economic impacts of their actions.  This cavalier 
approach to their job is particularly damaging at a time of 
painfully high unemployment when American businesses 
face hundreds of forthcoming rules mandated by the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  This is just the latest in a series of SEC 
reprimands and confirms the need for Congressional 
action.82 
 
Congressional action would soon follow on both the oversight and 
legislative fronts. 
 
 79. Mike Crapo, Crapo, Shelby Concerned by IG Reports on Dodd-Frank 
Implementation, MIKE CRAPO: NEWSROOM/NEWS RELEASES (June 16, 2011), 
https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/crapo-shelby-concerned-by-ig-reports-
on-dodd-frank-implementation [https://perma.cc/ZZB4-WAWR]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 82. Richard Shelby, Shelby, Crapo: Further Evidence of Careless Rulemaking, RICHARD 
SHELBY: NEWS RELEASES (July 22, 2011), 
https://www.shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsreleases?ID=D5998BF5-9D64-4254-
B593-E519DDD67D94 [https://perma.cc/TY7Y-ARBV]. 
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With Republicans in control of the House of Representatives in 
the 112th Congress starting in January 2011, multiple House committees 
and subcommittees stepped up their oversight of rulemaking under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  As a result, agencies were required increasingly to 
spend time justifying their rule proposals and economic analyses to 
Congress.  For example, at a congressional hearing titled The SEC’s 
Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis,83 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro 
defended her agency’s rulemaking practices and unveiled new internal 
guidance for producing future economic analyses.84  Just over a week 
later, she appeared on Capitol Hill again to testify on the same topic.85   
In addition to initiating time-consuming oversight hearings, 
Members of Congress also introduced legislation seeking to embed 
additional cost-benefit requirements in law.  Representative Scott Garrett, 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, introduced the SEC Regulatory 
Accountability Act.86  The initial bill required that the SEC “propose or 
adopt a regulation or order only on a reasoned determination that the 
benefits of the intended regulation or order justify the costs.”87  In 
addition, the bill added a list of additional “considerations” the SEC may 
take into account as part of its analysis of the costs and benefits of a 
proposed regulation or order.88  By requiring the benefits in favor of the 
regulation to outweigh the costs, the bill converted cost-benefit analysis 
from an analytical tool for rule development into a threshold requirement.   
In testimony on the proposed legislation, Chairman Schapiro 
detailed the impact that the proposed legislation would have on SEC 
rulemaking: 
 
 83. The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T 
REFORM (Apr. 17, 2012), https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/hearing/the-secs-aversion-
to-cost-benefit-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/U7ZV-9V7P]. 
 84. Testimony Concerning Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the Oversight 
& Gov’t Reform Comm., 112th Cong. 1–17 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/4-17-12-Schapiro-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6SZ-2A2B]. 
 85. Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th 
Cong. 52–66 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg75091/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg75091.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X6ZA-4YXP]. 
 86. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 87. Id. § 2. 
 88. Id. 
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The bill enumerates eleven new factors for the SEC to 
consider in its economic analysis, each of which would 
create a new potential challenge to future rules.  
Moreover, a number of these new factors are potentially 
in conflict with the SEC’s mission, duplicative of existing 
requirements, unrelated to SEC rulemaking, or unclear in 
scope.  For example, the bill’s direction to “assess the best 
ways of protecting market participants” could conflict 
with the SEC’s mission.  The SEC’s mission is to protect 
investors, which in some cases means protecting them 
from certain market participants.89 
 
She also pointed out that the bill extended these requirements beyond 
rulemaking to include agency orders, resulting in a need for a cost-benefit 
analysis whenever the SEC sought to bring an enforcement order.90 
As the bill was amended and reported to the full House for 
consideration,91 its purpose became clearer.  Recognizing the political 
peril of requiring cost-benefit analyses for enforcement orders, the 
amended version of the bill limited its requirements to “orders of general 
applicability.”92  However, in almost every other respect, the bill layered 
on additional requirements that were more prescriptive than the original 
version.  The bill also was amended to require that the SEC “shall” 
consider certain factors, where the original version merely said the SEC 
“may” consider them.93  In addition, it required the SEC to assess the 
costs and benefits of a proposed rule and “choose the approach that 
maximizes net benefits.”94  Similarly, the amended bill required the SEC 
to “evaluate whether, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, the 
regulation is tailored to impose the least burden on society, including 
market participants, individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other 
 
 89. Testimony on “Fixing the Watchdog: Legislative Proposals to Improve and Enhance 
the Securities and Exchange Commission”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
112th Cong. 134 (2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72603/pdf/CHRG-
112hhrg72603.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM75-SFRG]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. H.R. 2308 § 2 (2011) (as amended). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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entities.”95  By requiring subjective determinations through the specific 
language used, such as “maximizes” or “least burden,” the bill guaranteed 
that any rule could be subject to a subsequent legal challenge, and that 
any court could substitute its judgment for that of the agency.  The bill 
also added a host of post-adoption requirements96 that could trigger an 
endless stream of additional legal challenges, even if the original proposal 
was successfully promulgated.  Although two versions of the bill would 
pass the House, one in the 113th Congress97 and another in the 115th 
Congress,98 the Senate never considered the legislation. 
The effort to add cost-benefit criteria in agency rulemaking 
through legislation was also reflected in the introduction of the Financial 
Regulatory Responsibility Act (“FRRA”)99 by Senator Shelby.  The 
FRRA included many of the requirements found in the SEC Regulatory 
Accountability Act,100 but the FRRA would have applied them to all of 
the federal financial regulators.101  However, the FRRA also would have 
prohibited an agency from issuing a regulation if it “determine[d] that the 
quantified costs [were] greater than the quantified benefits.”102  In 
essence, this provision would have permitted a financial regulator to 
nullify a provision of law duly passed by Congress and signed by the 
President if it determined that the costs outweighed the benefits—that is, 
unless Congress voted to override the agency’s judgment and allow the 
rule to go forward.103 
The bill also enhanced its cost-benefit requirements by including 
a new judicial review requirement that expanded the standing to legally 
challenge a rule promulgated by a financial regulator to any “person that 
is adversely affected or aggrieved by the regulation.104  Additionally, it 
established a statutory standard of review by including a requirement that 
the court shall vacate any rule where the court finds that the agency did 
not comply with the cost-benefit provisions of the bill,105 inviting the 
court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency in any rulemaking.  
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., id. 
 97. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 98. SEC Regulatory Act, H.R. 78, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 99. Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 100. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
 101. S. 1615 § 2. 
 102. Id. § 3(b)(4). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. § 8(a). 
 105. Id. § 8(c). 
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The judicial review elements of the bill also demonstrated conclusively 
that the legislation went far beyond the prior Executive Orders regarding 
agency cost-benefit analyses that the bill’s supporters claimed they were 
simply trying to memorialize in statute.  While the bill created new 
standards of judicial review, the prior Executive Orders explicitly did not 
create new legal rights enforceable by the courts.106  Ultimately, the bill 
was never considered by the Senate. 
In a third bill focused on cost-benefit analysis, Senator Rob 
Portman introduced the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act 
(“IARAA”).107  Taking a slightly different approach, the IARAA 
authorized the President to issue an Executive Order to require specified 
elements in their economic analyses for all independent federal 
agencies.108  The Executive Order  contemplated by the bill also would 
require all independent regulatory agencies to submit their proposed 
regulations to the Office and Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for review.109  If OIRA 
determined that the agency had not satisfied the requirements of the 
Executive Order, the agency would have to respond to OIRA’s 
criticisms.110  Although the bill included language that “the compliance 
or noncompliance of an independent regulatory agency with the 
requirements of an Executive Order issued under this Act shall not be 
subject to judicial review[,]”111 the bill also required that OIRA’s analysis 
be made part of the rulemaking public record.112  
 
 106. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41585, 41587–88 (July 14, 2011) 
(“This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its 
departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.”); 
Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), 
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8M7J-QKX4] (“Nothing in this Executive order shall affect any otherwise 
available judicial review of agency action.  This Executive order is intended only to improve 
the internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, 
its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”). 
 107. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act (“IARAA”), S. 3468, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 108. Id. § 3(a). 
 109. Id. § 3(c). 
 110. Id. § 3(c)(3). 
 111. Id. § 4(a). 
 112. Id. § 4(b) (requiring inclusion of the OIRA analysis within the rulemaking record 
provides an opportunity for a court to give deference to the OIRA review in its review of the 
underlying cost-benefit analysis). 
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The prospects for passage of the IARAA spurred the heads of the 
federal financial regulators to write the Senate sponsors, warning them 
that the bill “would give any President unprecedented authority to 
influence the policy and rulemaking functions of independent regulatory 
agencies and would constitute a fundamental change in the role of 
independent regulatory agencies.”113  As the agency heads recognized, 
the new bill escalated well beyond an effort to impose new requirements 
on cost-benefit analyses subject to judicial review, instead presenting an 
existential threat that “would undermine the independence of the 
independent agencies and, and with it, their ability to do their jobs.”114 
Although none of the bills described above were enacted into law, 
they were introduced and debated in several subsequent Congresses, and 
the debate on precisely what cost-benefit requirements should be applied 
to financial regulators continued.  In March 2019, the Trump 
Administration added a new element to the debate when it issued 
guidance115 to require independent agencies to submit their regulations to 
OMB, ostensibly for review for compliance with the Congressional 
Review Act.116  The Congressional Review Act requires that “major 
rules” be submitted to Congress before they take effect,117 and the OMB 
guidance on its face establishes a process for OIRA to determine whether 
a proposed regulation constitutes a “major rule” under the statute.118  
However, the OMB guidance also effectively requires independent 
agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses under OIRA standards and 
submit them and any proposed rule to OIRA for review prior to issuing a 
new regulation or guidance.119  By leveraging the requirements of the 
Congressional Review Act, OMB appears to be attempting to achieve 
 
 113. Letter from federal financial regulators to U.S. Senators Joseph Lieberman & Susan 
Collins (Oct. 26, 2012), 
https://www.foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/regs/financial_regulators_ltr_lieberman_c
ollins_s3468.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VEP-BAC4]. 
 114. Teresa Tritch, Making Independent Agencies Less Independent, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION 
(Nov. 6, 2012, 5:44 PM), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/making-
independent-agencies-less-independent/ [https://perma.cc/36YM-ZUBD]. 
 115. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM 
FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: GUIDANCE ON COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 2–4 (Apr. 11, 2019) [hereinafter OMB GUIDANCE 
MEMORANDUM], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CAY9-WGS6]. 
 116. Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847, 868–74 
(1996). 
 117. Id.; see also infra Part IV.F. 
 118. OMB GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 115, passim. 
 119. Id. 
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many of the same results of the IARAA without Congress passing the 
bill.  If the independent agencies accede to the OMB guidance, it will 
give the Executive Branch unprecedented control over the rulemaking 
activities of the independent financial regulatory agencies.120  The impact 
of the new guidance and the willingness of the independent financial 
regulators to accept its limitations remains an open question. 
Few issues had a greater impact on rulemaking under the Dodd-
Frank Act than the many issues surrounding the supporting economic 
analyses.  Rules were delayed as agencies put additional resources and 
time into refining their economic analyses.121  In addition, as mentioned 
above, some of the agencies established formal policies to support the 
economic analysis in their rulemakings122 with some evidence that the 
new policies were producing economic analyses that were more 
 
 120. Hal S. Scott, OMB’s Guidance Memorandum to Independent Agencies, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 26, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/26/ombs-guidance-memorandum-to-independent-
agencies/ [https://perma.cc/PQ6J-Y2MX] (“[The OMB Guidance Memorandum] could be 
read to require, for the first time, that independent financial regulatory agencies (‘IFRAs’) 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis under OIRA methodology of all proposed rules, and that such 
analysis be reviewed by OIRA.”); William Funk, OMB Leveraging the CRA to Add to Its 
Oversight of Independent Regulatory Agencies, YALE J. ON REG. (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://yalejreg.com/nc/omb-leveraging-the-cra-to-add-to-its-oversight-of-independent-
regulatory-agencies-by-william-funk/ [https://perma.cc/26CK-AX3F] (noting that OMB is 
effectively applying the same cost-benefit standards that it requires for executive agencies to 
independent agencies by claiming that the only way it can make the major rule determination 
is to have independent regulatory agencies engage in essentially the same procedures as 
executive agencies with respect to the adoption of final rules and guidance); accord OMB 
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 115, passim. 
 121. Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC Looks to Economists for Legal Cover, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 16, 
2012), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2012-04-16-sns-rt-sececonomic-
analysisl2e8fg6xg-20120416-story.html [https://perma.cc/A6HN-5SGJ] (“Since the SEC’s 
proxy access rule was overturned, the pace of Dodd-Frank rulemaking at the agency has 
slowed considerably.”). 
 122. E.g., Memorandum from Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation 
(“RSFI”) & Office of the General Counsel (“OGC”), U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, on Current 
Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemakings, to Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions 
and Offices, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 16, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RZ5A-YDCE]; Statement of Policy on the Development and Review of 
Regulations and Policies, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., (last updated Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-400.html [https://perma.cc/XVL9-
M9EX]; U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, AN INVESTIGATION REGARDING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS 
UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT 21 (2011), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig_in
vestigation_041511.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK58-MMAP]. 
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defensible in the courts.123  Joint agency rulemakings were especially 
difficult because each agency needed to satisfy their individual 
rulemaking and analysis requirements.  Opponents of specific rules laid 
the groundwork for legal challenges through detailed comment letters 
that raised a multitude of potential impacts, cost considerations, and 
alternative approaches, forcing the agencies to respond to all of them or 
otherwise risk having their rulemaking judged “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the APA.124  Agencies governed by boards and commissions now 
found minority members routinely challenging the economic analyses 
underlying their rule proposals, providing a boost to legal challenges.   
The ultimate impact of the focus on economic analysis in 
promulgating regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act remains the subject 
of considerable debate.  Some commentators have expressed concern that 
legal and judicial requirements for economic analysis have created an 
environment where rulemaking is unnecessarily delayed or extremely 
difficult to successfully accomplish, resulting in undesirable 
consequences, such as delay, unending legal challenges, and rulemaking 
by enforcement.125  Others have argued that the focus on economic 
analysis has been appropriate and has resulted in better, more effective 
regulations that properly take into account the impact on the public.126  In 
 
 123. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[W]e find it 
difficult to see what the Commission could have done better.”). 
 124. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“[In reviewing 
an agency action, t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions of law found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with the law . . . .”); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983) (establishing multi-factor test agencies must 
satisfy to successfully defend arbitrary and capricious challenges). 
 125. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case 
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2015) (“[P]recise,  reliable,  quantified  
CBA  remains  unfeasible.”); Donna M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis 
in SEC Rulemaking, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 159–60 (2015) (“[T]he costs of such mandatory 
analysis in SEC rulemaking include: SEC paralysis, new investor-driven challenges to 
deregulatory  initiatives, an increasing tendency for regulation by enforcement, a greater 
penchant for informal and unofficial rulemaking by the SEC staff, and fewer congressional 
delegations of authority or discretion to the SEC.”). 
 126. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 
U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 935–43 (2018) (arguing that the regulators’ cost-benefit analyses were 
defective and the courts were right to require the agencies to show that their regulations passed 
an adequate cost-benefit analysis); Jerry Ellig, Improvements in SEC Economic Analysis Since 
Business Roundtable: A Structured Assessment 7, 48 (Mercantus Center, George Mason 
University, Mercatus Working Paper, 2016), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-ellig-sec-business-roundtable-v1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E8M7-4SGJ] (“[J]udicial review can prompt a regulatory agency to produce 
higher-quality analysis and to provide a more complete explanation of how that analysis 
affected its decisions.”). 
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either case, the debate over economic analysis became one of the defining 
backdrops for implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act over the past 
decade and has more broadly shaped administrative law for years to 
come. 
B. Constitutional Challenges 
1.  The “Kitchen Sink” Strategy: State National Bank of Big Spring v. 
Lew 
The broadest constitutional challenge to the Dodd-Frank Act and 
the rules promulgated thereunder was brought by a relatively small 
national bank in Texas which included a wide range of legal challenges.  
In State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew,127 the bank challenged the 
constitutionality of: (1) Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, which established 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”);128 (2) Title II of the 
Act, which established the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”);129 
and (3) Title X, which established the CFPB.130  For good measure, the 
bank also challenged the constitutionality of the recess appointment of 
the CFPB Director.131  Ultimately, the bank was joined in the suit by the 
Attorneys General of eleven states.132 
In arguing that Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act was 
unconstitutional, the plaintiffs contended that it violated the non-
delegation doctrine133 and separation of powers principles based on the 
 
 127. State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 128. Id. at 52, 54–55; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2018) (establishing FSOC). 
 129. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 52, 55–57; see also Dodd-Frank § 204, 12 U.S.C. § 
5384 (2018) (establishing necessary authority and providing purpose and procedure for 
orderly liquidation of covered financial institutions). 
 130. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 51, 53–54; see also Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 
5491 (2018) (establishing Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, commonly known as 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or CFPB); Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 
(2018) (providing purpose, objectives, and functions of CFPB). 
 131. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 52. 
 132. Those eleven states whose Attorneys General joined in the suit were Alabama, 
Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, 
and West Virginia.  See id. at 50–51. 
 133. The non-delegation doctrine is the principle that Congress cannot delegate its 
legislative powers to agencies, thereby preserving the separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 458 
(2001) (“When conferring decisionmaking authority upon agencies, Congress must lay down 
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.” 
(citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))). 
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Act’s broad grant of authority to FSOC to designate institutions as 
systemically important financial institutions (“SIFI”), thereby subjecting 
them to enhanced government oversight.134  Given that the bank was not 
a nonbank financial company, as defined by the statute, and that banks 
are specifically exempt from the provisions of Title I, the bank argued 
instead that it had standing because it was harmed competitively by 
FSOC’s designation of GE Capital as a SIFI.135  Writing for a unanimous 
panel, then-Judge Kavanaugh found “the link between (i) the enhanced 
regulation of GE Capital, (ii) any alleged reputational benefit to GE 
Capital, and (iii) any harm to State National Bank is simply too attenuated 
and speculative to show the causation necessary to support standing.”136 
The constitutional challenges to Title II were based on the State 
plaintiffs’ claim as possible creditors of future financial companies 
potentially subject to the Dodd-Frank Act’s OLA provisions.  The States 
argued that they had suffered a loss of statutory rights they previously 
enjoyed under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  They contended that they 
could suffer future harm based on the provisions of OLA that permitted 
the FDIC to treat similarly situated creditors differently under certain 
circumstances than the uniform treatment they would receive under 
bankruptcy.  Again, the court determined that the claims failed on 
standing and ripeness grounds, given that the claim did not involve the 
actual application of Title II and was based on a set of highly speculative 
preconditions before the States could demonstrate that they had been 
harmed.137  Judge Kavanaugh wrote: “It is premature for a court to 
consider the legality of how the Government might wield the orderly 
liquidation authority in a potential future proceeding.”138  The court also 
noted that, “[i]f the State plaintiffs are injured at some point in the future 
by a liquidation or reorganization under the Government’s orderly 
liquidation authority, the State plaintiffs can seek to raise their 
 
 134. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 52, 54–55; see also, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 112, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5322(a)(1)(A) (2018) (“The purposes of the [FSOC] are . . . to identify risks to the financial 
stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or 
ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial 
companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace . . . .”). 
 135. The bank contended that GE Capital’s designation as a SIFI provided it a competitive 
advantage over the bank because investors might perceive GE Capital, as a SIFI, to be safer 
due to the possibility of government backing and enhanced supervision.  State Nat’l Bank, 
795 F.3d at 55. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 56. 
 138. Id. 
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constitutional arguments then, as the Government acknowledges.”139  Yet 
some commentators have noted that because plaintiffs cannot challenge 
OLA in advance of its use, which will be by definition in an emergency 
situation, the decision “raises serious doubts about the viability of OLA 
challenges.”140 
The remaining constitutional challenges to the Dodd-Frank Act 
in State National Bank of Big Spring involved the CFPB.141  The plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of the structure of the CFPB as an 
independent agency under a single Director.142  The plaintiffs also 
challenged the constitutionality of the recess appointment of CFPB’s 
Director.143  Unlike the other constitutional challenges in the case, the 
D.C. Circuit reversed the district court, determined that the plaintiffs did 
have standing to raise the constitutionality of the structure of the CFPB 
and the appointment of its Director and remanded the case.144 
On remand, the district court was forced to consider the issue of 
the constitutionality of the recess appointment where the Director 
ultimately had been confirmed by the Senate while the case was working 
its way through the courts.145  Subsequent to his confirmation, Director 
Cordray ratified the actions he had taken during his recess appointment.  
The court determined that the ratification “saves the regulations from 
plaintiff’s challenge.”146   
2.  Independent Agency Structure: The CFPB Line of Cases 
The constitutional challenge to the structure of the CFPB raised 
in State National Bank of Big Spring was addressed by another case: PHH 
Corp. v. CFPB.147  In that case, the CFPB brought charges against PHH 
Corp., a large mortgage lender, for violations under the Real Estate 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Recent Case, State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 
2015), 129 HARV. L. REV. 835, 841 (2016). 
 141. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 51–52. 
 142. Id. at 51. 
 143. Id. at 52. 
 144. Id. at 57. 
 145. President Obama re-nominated Richard Cordray as Director of the CFPB on January 
24, 2013, and he was confirmed by the Senate on July 16, 2013. 
 146. State Nat’l Bank, No. 12-1032 ESH (D.D.C. 2016) (order and judgment of D.C. 
District Court on remand from D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/18-307-opinion-below.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YGQ7-XTV4]. 
 147. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”).148  In his decision to bring 
charges, the CFPB Director read the statute to support a broader finding 
of misconduct than the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who had heard 
the case.  Consequently, the Director significantly increased the 
disgorgement from the $6.4 million recommended by the ALJ to $109 
million.  PHH Corp., among other issues, challenged the constitutionality 
of the structure of the CFPB with a sole Director, with a five-year term 
in office, subject to removal by the President only for “inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”149  Specifically, PHH Corp. 
asserted that this structure was inconsistent with Article II of the 
Constitution that vests executive power in the President.150   
A splintered D.C. Circuit, hearing the case en banc, rejected PHH 
Corp.’s challenge and found that the “for cause” removal protections for 
the CFPB Director are consistent with other independent regulatory 
agencies,151 that the functions of the CFPB are not core executive 
functions,152 and noted that such provisions had been consistently 
provided to independent financial regulators.153  In his dissent, then-
Judge Kavanaugh argued that prior independent agency precedents 
required that independent agencies have multi-member structures to pass 
constitutional muster.154  Neither party sought Supreme Court review. 
The constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure as an independent 
financial regulatory agency with a sole Director continues to generate 
legal challenges.  In CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC,155 the Southern 
District of New York rejected the en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit in 
PHH Corp. v. CFPB, and adopted the reasoning in Judge Kavanaugh’s 
dissent that the CFPB is unconstitutional “because it is an independent 
agency that exercises substantial executive power and is headed by a 
 
 148. Id. at 76–84; see Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 
1724 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17); 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2018). 
 149. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1011(c)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018); see PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 79–80, 84. 
 150. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 79–80, 84; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 151. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 80 (“Because we see no constitutional defect in Congress’s 
choice to bestow on the CFPB Director protection against removal except for ‘inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,’ we sustain it.”). 
 152. Id. (“Wide margins separate the validity of an independent CFPB from any 
unconstitutional effort to attenuate presidential control over core executive functions.”). 
 153. Id. (“Congress and the President have historically countenanced sole-headed 
financial regulatory bodies.”). 
 154. Id. at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 155. CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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single Director.”156  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is considering a 
case out of the Southern District of Mississippi, CFPB v. All American 
Check Cashing,157 where a company engaged in payday lending is 
challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure in an 
enforcement action.158  In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Collins v. Mnuchin159 found the structure of the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) unconstitutional by distinguishing it 
from the CFPB.160  In that case, the court hightlighted that FSOC has 
authority to act as a check on CFPB rulemaking, whereas the FHFA has 
no similar oversight authority.161   
3.  The Pending Supreme Court Decision: CFPB v. Seila Law 
In October 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case out of 
the Ninth Circuit, CFPB v. Seila Law.162  In that case, the CFPB is seeking 
to enforce a law firm’s compliance with a civil investigative demand.  
Among other defenses, the law firm challenged the constitutionality of 
the CFPB’s structure.  Affirming the decision of the district court and 
following the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in PHH Corp.,163 the Ninth 
Circuit held that the CFPB’s structure was constitutional.  In response to 
the firm’s petition for certiorari, the CFPB reversed the legal stance it had 
taken in the Ninth Circuit and its Director announced that the CFPB has 
“determined that the for-cause removal provision of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010 . . . is unconstitutional.”164   
 
 156. Id. at 784 (quoting PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 198 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). 
 157. CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, No. 3:16-cv-356-WHB-JCG, 2018 WL 9812125, 
slip op. at *1–4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2018). 
 158. Id. at *1; see Alan S. Kaplinsky, Fifth Circuit Hears Oral Argument in All American 
Check Cashing, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fifth-
circuit-hears-oral-argument-all-american-check-cashing [https://perma.cc/N5JK-7G2Y]. 
 159. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 160. Id. at 587–89. 
 161. Id. 
 162. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 427 
(2019).  The Court also directed the parties to brief and argue the question of: “If the [CFPB] 
is found unconstitutional on the basis of the separation of powers, can 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) 
be severed from the Dodd-Frank Act?”  140 S. Ct. 427. 
 163. Seila Law, 923 F.3d at 682 (“We see no need to re-plow the same ground here.”). 
 164. Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Nancy 
Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/Pelosi-
letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7DC-AES4]. 
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In questioning the constitutionality of her own agency, Director 
Kraninger said that she believes that a decision that the structure of the 
CFPB is unconstitutional “should not affect our ability to carry out the 
Bureau’s important mission.”165  However, the ability to sever the 
structure of the agency from its actions is by no means a certain result.166  
In reaching this view, Kraninger seems to be relying on the reasoning in 
the Kavanaugh dissent in PHH Corp. v. CFPB.  Applying the two-part 
test in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board,167 then-Judge Kavanaugh determined that severability of the “for 
cause protections” of the CFPB Director would be the appropriate 
remedy.168  However, Judge Henderson, in a separate dissenting opinion, 
argued: “In my view, the Congress would not have enacted Title X in its 
current form absent for-cause removal protection.  I believe, therefore, 
that the appropriate remedy for the CFPB’s Article II problem is to 
invalidate Title X in its entirety.”169  In addition, entities regulated by the 
CFPB  are arguing that “[t]he logical conclusion is, if the power vested 
in the Director is unconstitutional, then anything that stems from those 
powers is null and void because that power is unchecked.”170  In taking 
up the case, the Supreme Court has specifically directed the parties to 
address the question of severability.   
Even if the CFPB had not changed its position on 
constitutionality, it likely would not have had the opportunity to defend 
the constitutionality of its structure before the Court.  Although the CFPB 
has independent litigating authority,171 section 1054(e) of the Dodd-
Frank Act provides: 
 
 165. Kathleen L. Krainger, Director Kraninger’s Speech at the National Consumer 
Empowerment Conference, CFPB: NEWSROOM (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/director-kraningers-speech-national-
consumer-empowerment-conference/ [https://perma.cc/KW2H-GX4M]. 
 166. Evan Weinberger, CFPB May Not Get Supreme Court Closure It Wants, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (Oct. 4, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpb-may-not-
get-supreme-court-closure-it-wants [https://perma.cc/3VQ4-6FEB]. 
 167. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 168. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 199 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Severability is 
appropriate . . . so long as (i) Congress would have preferred the law with the offending 
provision severed over no law at all; and (ii) the law with the offending provision severed 
would remain ‘fully operative as a law.’” (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509)). 
 169. Id. at 160 (Henderson, J., dissenting). 
 170. Kate Berry, Kraninger’s Stance on CFPB Constitutionality Puts Rules in Limbo, AM. 
BANKER (Oct. 1, 2019, 12:07 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/kraningers-
stance-on-cfpb-constitutionality-puts-rules-in-limbo [https://perma.cc/TX53-V7HN]. 
 171. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1054(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5564(b) (2018). 
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The Bureau may represent itself in its own name before 
the Supreme Court of the United States, provided that the 
Bureau makes a written request to the Attorney General 
within the 10-day period which begins on the date of 
entry of the judgment which would permit any party to 
file a petition for writ of certiorari, and the Attorney 
General concurs with such request or fails to take action 
within 60 days of the request of the Bureau.172  
 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) already had made its position 
on the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure very clear.  In its brief 
opposing certiorari in State National Bank of Big Spring, the DOJ argued 
that restrictions on removal of the CFPB Director “impermissibly 
infringes on the President’s control of the Executive Branch, and 
unconstitutionally frustrates the President’s ‘responsibility to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.’”173  But the DOJ went on to say that, 
while the question was important, the State National Bank of Big Spring 
case “would be a poor vehicle for considering the constitutionality of the 
Bureau’s structure.”174  In particular, the DOJ pointed to the fact that 
Justice Kavanaugh’s participation in the decision at the Court of Appeals 
likely would preclude his participation in the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent consideration of the case.  However, the DOJ, referencing 
their position in State National Bank of Big Spring, argued that Seila Law 
“presents a suitable vehicle for the Court’s review of the question.”175  
With the CFPB abandoning its position that its structure was 
constitutional and joining the DOJ in opposition, the Court appointed an 
amicus to argue the case in support of the lower court’s judgment.176 
 
 172. Id. § 1054(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5564(e). 
 173. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 10, State Nat’l Bank 
of Big Spring v. Mnuchin, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 18-307) (quoting Free Enter. 
Fund, 561 U.S. at 493), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, CFPB 
v. Seila Law LLC, No. 19-7 (Sept. 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
7/116040/20190917144324154_19-7%20Seila%20Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWW2-
LLSW]. 
 176. Jordan S. Rubin, Clement ‘Unusual,’ ‘Excellent’ Friend for Wall Street Watchdog, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 25, 2019, 4:50 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-
week/clement-unusual-excellent-friend-for-wall-street-watchdog [https://perma.cc/QX3B-
JNW2]. 
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4.  Recess Appointments: National Labor Relations Board v. Noel 
Canning 
Although the court in State National Bank of Big Spring did not 
consider the question of the validity of CFPB Director Cordray’s recess 
appointment, that issue effectively would be addressed in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Noel Canning.177  In that case, the Supreme Court 
determined that President Obama’s recess appointment of three members 
of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) violated the 
requirements of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution that 
requires the President to obtain the “advice and consent” of the Senate 
when appointing an officer of the United States.178  The Court held that 
“[a] Senate recess that is so short that it does not require the consent of 
the House is not long enough to trigger the President’s recess-
appointment power.”179  Therefore, because Director Cordray’s recess 
appointment was made on the same day as the NLRB appointees, the 
Court’s decision would have applied to the constitutionality of his recess 
appointment had he not been subsequently re-nominated and confirmed. 
5.  Administrative Law Judges: Lucia v. SEC 
The appointment power of agency heads is not the only issue 
regarding appointments of government officials that has been raised by 
opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Prior to passage of the Act, the SEC 
could bring certain types of enforcement actions before its own ALJs but 
could only impose monetary penalties if the subject of the action was a 
regulated entity or a person associated with a regulated entity.  Section 
929P of the Dodd-Frank Act expanded this authority to impose monetary 
penalties to include any person who violates the federal securities laws.180 
In Lucia v. SEC,181 the SEC brought an enforcement action 
against an individual charging that he acted to deceive potential investors.  
In a proceeding before an SEC ALJ, Lucia was fined and banned from 
the industry.  Lucia challenged the validity of the proceeding, arguing 
 
 177. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
 178. Id. at 518–19, 528–38; accord U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 179. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 537. 
 180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
929P(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77h–1(g)(1) (2018). 
 181. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
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that the ALJ had not been properly appointed under the Appointments 
Clause.182  
The Appointments Clause states that “Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”183  
The key question for decision was whether the SEC ALJs were “officers” 
requiring appointment by the Commission or employees who could be 
appointed by other staff within the SEC.  In deciding the question, the 
majority looked to Freytag v. Commissioner184 to determine the status of 
SEC ALJs.  The Court found that ALJs held a continuing office 
established by law, that they exercise significant discretion in carrying 
out their adjudicative functions,185 and that they have the ability to issue 
decisions at the close of proceedings.186  Having met all of the elements 
present in Freytag, the Court held that the Commission’s ALJs were 
“Officers of the United States”187 and had been unconstitutionally 
appointed because the Commission had left the appointment of ALJs to 
SEC staff members.188 
The decision in Lucia completely changed the hiring process for 
the approximately 1900 ALJ positions across the government.189  
President Trump issued Executive Order 13843190 placing all ALJs in the 
excepted service and abolished the competitive hiring system under the 
Office of Personnel Management.  “Lucia and Executive Order 13843 
have made it necessary for agencies to construct new practices for [ALJ] 
hiring.”191 
 
 182. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (applying the “significant authority” test to 
adjudicative officials—specifically, to special trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court). 
 185. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.  As in Freytag, the SEC ALJs had the power to take 
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, as well as the power to enforce 
compliance with discovery orders.  See id. 
 186. Id.  The Court noted that the SEC ALJ decisions had greater independent effect, as 
their decisions become final if the Commission declines review.  See id. at 2053–54. 
 187. Id. at 2055. 
 188. Id.  The Court’s remedy was to provide a rehearing with a different ALJ.  See id. 
 189. JACK M. BEERMANN & JENNIFER L. MASCOTT, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
RESEARCH REPORT ON FEDERAL AGENCY ALJ HIRING AFTER LUCIA AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 
13843, at 3–6 (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Submitted%20final%20draft%20JB.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZAC8-AFTV] (“Agencies have now commenced working on altering their 
ALJ hiring procedures to conform to both the Lucia decision and the executive order.”). 
 190. Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 13, 2018). 
 191. BEERMANN & MASCOTT, supra note 189, at 26. 
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6.  First Amendment: National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC 
Beyond issues of the Appointments Clause, recess appointments, 
and the executive powers of the President, the breadth of the Dodd-Frank 
Act has even resulted in constitutional challenges on First Amendment 
grounds.  Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act192 required the SEC to 
issue regulations requiring firms using “conflict minerals”193 to report 
publicly whether they originated in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (“DRC”) or an adjoining country, and include “a description of 
the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not 
DRC conflict free.”194  In National Association of Manufacturers v. 
SEC,195 a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that certain specific reporting 
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act and the rules promulgated under 
them violated the First Amendment because it unconstitutionally 
compelled speech.196  The court held: 
 
At all events, it is far from clear that the 
description at issue—whether a product is “conflict 
free”—is factual and non-ideological.  Products and 
minerals do not fight conflicts.  The label “conflict free” 
is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the 
Congo war.  It requires an issuer to tell consumers that its 
products are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly 
finance armed groups.  An issuer, including an issuer who 
condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest 
terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral 
responsibility.197 
 
The court ruled that the statute and rule implementing section 1502 were 
unconstitutional only to the extent that they required regulated entities to 
 
 192. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1502(e)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m note). 
 193. Under section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, “[t]he term ‘conflict mineral’ means[:]  
(A) columbite-tantalite  (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or (B) any  
other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”  Id. 
 194. Id. § 1502(p)(1)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii) (2018). 
 195. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 196. Id. at 533. 
 197. Id. at 554. 
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report to the Commission and to state on their website that any of their 
products have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’”198 
It also is worth noting that the D.C. Circuit was compelled to 
review the cost-benefit analysis performed by the SEC in support of the 
rule, and it did “not see any problems with the Commission’s cost-side 
analysis.”199  In what surely must have been a relief to the SEC, the court 
went on to say, “we find it difficult to see what the Commission could 
have done better.”200 
Shortly after the case was remanded back to the SEC, Acting 
Chairman Piwowar announced that he had directed staff to reconsider 
how companies should comply with the law and to solicit comments from 
the public on whether SEC staff should update its guidance on 
compliance.201  Subsequently, Piwowar announced that the SEC was 
suspending enforcement of the rule.202  In a reversal of roles, supporters 
of the Dodd-Frank Act in the person of Commissioner Stein criticized the 
action stating that “[i]t is unprecedented for one commissioner, acting 
alone and without official notice and comment, to engage in de facto 
rulemaking.”203   
C. Other Significant Litigation 
1.  FSOC Designations of Non-Bank Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions 
In MetLife v. Financial Stability Oversight Council,204 MetLife—
a non-bank financial institution—challenged its designation by FSOC as 
a non-bank SIFI.  Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act205 empowers FSOC 
 
 198. Id. at 556. 
 199. Id. at 552. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Sarah N. Lynch, Acting SEC Chair Seeks to Scale Back ‘Conflict Minerals’ Rule, 
REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2017, 7:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-
conflictminerals/acting-sec-chair-seeks-to-scale-back-conflict-minerals-rule-
idUSKBN15G2ZF [https://perma.cc/T7EK-CD9B]. 
 202. Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Halts Some Enforcement of Conflict Minerals Rule Amid 
Review, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2017, 3:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-
conflictminerals/sec-halts-some-enforcement-of-conflict-minerals-rule-amid-review-
idUSKBN1792WX [https://perma.cc/Z367-VXTJ]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. MetLife, Inc. v. FSOC, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2018). 
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to determine that a nonbank financial company “shall be supervised by 
the Federal Reserve and shall be subject to prudential standards.”206  In 
making the determination, FSOC is required to consider ten statutorily 
enumerated factors and “any other risk-related factors that the Council 
deems appropriate.”207  FSOC subsequently issued guidance on its 
designation of SIFIs.208  On December 18, 2014, FSOC voted to 
designate MetLife as a SIFI and MetLife sued to challenge the 
designation. 
Although section 113 limited judicial review to “whether the final 
determination . . . was arbitrary and capricious,”209 the district court in 
MetLife rescinded the designation on two grounds.  First, the court found 
that “FSOC made critical departures from two of the standards it adopted 
in its Guidance, never explaining such departures or even recognizing 
them as such.”210  By failing to assess MetLife’s vulnerability to material 
financial distress and failing to determine that MetLife’s material 
financial distress would materially impact MetLife counterparties, the 
court determined that FSOC’s designation was arbitrary and 
capricious.211 
In addition, the court found the designation to be arbitrary and 
capricious because FSOC did not consider the cost of regulation.212  
Although there was no requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act requiring an 
analysis of costs, the court held that the “decision intentionally refused to 
consider the cost of regulation, a consideration that is essential to 
reasoned rulemaking.”213  The court also determined that FSOC was 
required to consider the costs of regulation in its designation by the 
statutory language that it “consider any other risk-related factors that [it] 
deems appropriate.”214  Thus, presumably any designation would require 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2). 
 208. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial 
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310). 
 209. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h). 
 210. MetLife, Inc. v. FSOC, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 230 (2016). 
 211. Id. at 239 (“Having announced two key interpretations, FSOC was required either to 
maintain them or to explain its deviation from them.  It did neither.  FSOC’s reversal on either 
of these interpretations is enough to rescind the Final Determination as arbitrary and 
capricious.”). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(k); MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 241 (citing 
12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(k) as “the textual hook” requiring FSOC to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 214. MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 240–41. 
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a finding that the costs of regulation integral to the designation must be 
outweighed by the congressionally determined, but not quantified, 
benefit of a safer financial system. 
The Obama Administration appealed the district court’s MetLife 
decision, but the Trump Administration settled the case215 and the parties 
withdrew the appeal.216  The drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act were deeply 
concerned by a decision that went straight to the heart of one of the key 
provisions of the Act designed to address future problems before they 
became systemic.  Former House Financial Services Committee 
Chairman, Barney Frank, stated that he “was surprised that the district 
court judge substituted her judgment for the FSOC’s on a specific issue 
that is solely within its jurisdiction and competence.”217  He went on to 
say he “was shocked that the judge went on to substitute her judgment for 
that of the entire Congress, by effectively amending the statute.”218  
Three years into the Trump Administration, none of the non-bank 
entities originally designated as SIFIs by FSOC retain their 
designations.219  While MetLife avoided designation through litigation, 
GE Capital and AIG altered their business structures to reduce their 
potential systemic impact.  Prudential was de-designated by a vote of 
FSOC, now composed of Trump Administration regulators, following “a 
detailed analysis showing that there is not a significant risk that the 
company could pose a threat to financial stability.”220  Whether because 
of the litigation or a change its philosophical approach,  FSOC announced 
 
 215. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Mnuchin Statement on the 
MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council Appeal (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/index.php/news/press-releases/sm0254 [https://perma.cc/HBP5-
WN6A] (“I am pleased that the Justice Department has settled the MetLife case, consistent 
with the recommendation by a majority of FSOC voting members.  Treasury has 
recommended specific reforms to make the designation process more analytically rigorous, 
clear, and transparent.”). 
 216. Pete Schroeder, MetLife, U.S. Regulators Agree to Set Aside Legal Fight, REUTERS 
(Jan. 18, 2018, 8:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-metlife-fsoc/metlife-u-s-
regulators-agree-to-set-aside-legal-fight-idUSKBN1F8064 [https://perma.cc/VC6G-24LK]. 
 217. Arthur D. Postal, Dodd-Frank Drafters Rip MetLife Ruling, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY 
CTR. (June 23, 2016), https://www.theusconstitution.org/news/dodd-frank-drafters-rip-
metlife-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/XH99-X2FS]. 
 218. Id. 
 219. John Heltman, Prudential, the Last Nonbank SIFI, Sheds the Label, AM. BANKER 
(Oct. 17, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-the-last-
nonbank-sifi-sheds-the-label [https://perma.cc/J9BP-334Y] (noting that the original 
designations included MetLife, GE Capital, AIG, and Prudential). 
 220. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Announces Rescission of Nonbank Financial Company Designation (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm525 [https://perma.cc/8R8B-E6QS]. 
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its intention to move away from an entity-based approach in designating 
individual firms as SIFIs to “an activities-based approach to identifying 
and addressing potential risks to financial stability.”221  It is unclear how 
effective this new approach to this key element of the Dodd-Frank Act 
will be in identifying and placing regulatory restraints on nonbank 
financial institutions that contribute to systemic risk. 
2.  Statutory Interpretation: Risk-Retention Requirement for CLO 
Managers 
Litigation also has defined the parameters of the statutory 
language in parts of the Dodd-Frank Act and the willingness of courts to 
interpret the statutory language broadly.  In Loan Syndications & Trading 
Association v. SEC,222 the court considered the application of the Act’s 
risk retention requirements223 to managers of open-market collateralized 
loan obligations (“CLO”), a type of asset-backed security.224  Section 941 
of the Act directs the SEC, Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC to jointly 
promulgate “regulations to require any securitizer to retain an economic 
interest in a portion of the credit risk for any asset that the securitizer, 
through the issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells, or 
conveys to a third party,”225 specifically requiring that the securitizer 
retain “not less than 5% of the credit risk of any asset.”226  The SEC and 
Fed subsequently issued a regulation applying this requirement to 
managers of CLOs.227  The CLO managers argued that the language of 
the statute did not reach to their activities. 
The D.C. Circuit held that the activities of the CLO managers did 
not come under the definition of securitizer under the statute, stating that 
“[t]he agencies’ interpretation seems to stretch the statute beyond the 
natural meaning of what Congress wrote.”228  In rejecting the agencies’ 
 
 221. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Proposes Changes to Nonbank Designations Guidance (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm621 [https://perma.cc/NL55-7JTM]. 
 222. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 223. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2018); see id. § 941(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(79) (2018) (defining 
“asset-backed security”). 
 224. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(1). 
 225. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(2). 
 226. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i). 
 227. 12 C.F.R. § 244.9 (2019) (Fed); 17 C.F.R. § 246.9 (2019) (SEC). 
 228. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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arguments for an expansive reading of the statute that would encompass 
CLO managers, the court said that it would 
 
sweep in brokers, lawyers, and non-CLO investment 
managers who, though they play a part in organizing 
securities and “causing” the transfer of securitized assets, 
are clearly not the initiators of securitizations that 
Congress intended to regulate.  That the agencies’ 
interpretation sweeps so far beyond any reasonable 
estimate of the congressional purpose confirms our view 
that the interpretation is beyond the statutory language.229 
 
Although the court acknowledged that statutory language might 
not reach all of the types of transactions that the regulators desired to 
cover or Congress intended, it stated that if the language resulted in a  
loophole, “it is one that the statute itself creates, and not one that the 
agencies may close with an unreasonable distortion of the text’s ordinary 
meaning.”230  With this decision, the court signaled its intent to carefully 
circumscribe the agencies’ interpretations of the extensive grants of 
regulatory authority in the Dodd-Frank Act within the limits of the 
statute’s language.231 
3.  Statutorily-Mandated Reporting: Payments for Extractive Minerals 
The set of cases surrounding provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
regarding reporting of payments for extractive minerals may be 
illustrative of the future course of litigation under the Act involving 
dueling lawsuits and competing legislative mandates.  Unlike most 
statutorily required reporting to the SEC which is intended for the benefit 
of investors, section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act,232 like the reporting 
requirements of section 1502233 described above,234 was designed to 
 
 229. Id. at 224–25. 
 230. Id. at 226. 
 231. For a more fulsome discussion of this case, see Elliot Ganz & Phillip Black, CLO 
Risk Retention: A Case Study in Regulatory Indiscretion, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. Parts II–III 
(2020). 
 232. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2220–22 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78m(q)(2)(A)). 
 233. Id. § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m note). 
 234. See discussion supra Part III.B.6. 
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serve a social goal of improving transparency of payments to 
governments regarding resource extraction.  Specifically, section 1504 
provided: 
 
Not later than 270 days after July 21, 2010, the 
Commission shall issue final rules that require each 
resource extraction issuer to include in an annual report 
of the resource extraction issuer information relating to 
any payment made by the resource extraction issuer, a 
subsidiary of the resource extraction issuer, or an entity 
under the control of the resource extraction issuer to a 
foreign government or the Federal Government for the 
purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals.235   
 
Section 1504 also provided that, “[t]o the extent practicable, the 
Commission shall make available online, to the public, a compilation of 
the information required to be submitted.”236 
For a number of reasons, including the difficulty of completing 
an economic analysis on the new congressional mandate, the Commission 
did not meet the required deadline.  In May 2012, Oxfam America, a 
“global organization working to end the injustice of poverty”237 and a 
supporter of the provision, filed suit against the SEC to compel it to move 
forward with the implementing regulation, arguing that it was unlawfully 
delaying the issuance of the rule.238  Subsequently, the SEC issued a final 
rule in August 2012.239  Following the release of the final rule, Oxfam 
America dropped its suit. 
The new rule’s opponents then filed suit challenging the 
regulation.  In American Petroleum Institute v. SEC,240 the district court 
vacated the rule and remanded it back to the SEC.  Although the 
opponents raised both First Amendment and cost-benefit issues, the court 
 
 235. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A). 
 236. Id. § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(3)(A). 
 237. About Oxfam, OXFAM AM., https://www.oxfamamerica.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/7SNB-HUSN] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
 238. Oxfam America Files Lawsuit Against Securities and Exchange Commission, OXFAM 
AM.: PRESS RELEASES (May 16, 2012), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/oxfam-america-
files-lawsuit-against-securities-and-exchange-commission/ [https://perma.cc/6C2K-M9BB]. 
 239. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56365 (Sept. 
12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
 240. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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instead ruled on narrower grounds, stating that “the Commission misread 
the statute to mandate public disclosure of the reports, and its decision to 
deny any exemption [for countries that prohibit payment disclosure] was, 
given the limited explanation provided, arbitrary and capricious.”241   
When the SEC did not issue a revised final rule by September 
2014, Oxfam America sued the SEC again claiming that it was unlawfully 
withholding a final rule implementing section 1504.242  In Oxfam 
America, Inc. v. SEC,243 the district court held that the SEC’s failure to 
promulgate a final disclosure rule constituted agency action unlawfully 
withheld under the APA.244  The SEC argued that it had promulgated a 
final rule and had not unlawfully withheld action, but the rule had been 
vacated by the D.C. District Court.245  The court rejected the SEC’s 
argument and held that the remand simply restored the status quo and 
“that the SEC’s delay in promulgating the final extraction payments 
disclosure rule can be considered ‘unlawfully withheld’ as the duty to 
promulgate a final extraction payments disclosure rule remains 
unfulfilled more than four years past Congress’s deadline.”246  The court 
ordered the SEC to file an expedited schedule for filing the rule.247 
After having lost separate litigation battles to both opponents and 
supporters of the rule, the SEC issued its new final rule in June 2016.248  
Reporting under the new rule became effective in September 2016, but 
reporting was not required until 2019.249  However, before the rule’s 
reporting requirements became mandatory, Congress invalidated the rule 
in early 2017 under the Congressional Review Act.250  These specific 
provisions of the Congressional Review Act are discussed in more detail 
in Part IV of this Article.251 
 
 241. Id. at 11. 
 242. See Oxfam America Sues SEC Over Delay on Oil, Gas and Mining Transparency 
Rules, OXFAM AM.: PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 18, 2014), 
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/oxfam-america-sues-sec-over-delay-on-oil-gas-and-
mining-transparency-rules/ [https://perma.cc/2EBJ-HENQ]. 
 243. Oxfam Am., Inc. v. SEC, 126 F. Supp. 3d 168 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 244. Id. at 172. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 176. 
 248. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49360 (July 27, 
2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 (1996). 
 251. See discussion infra Part IV.F. 
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The legal battle around section 1504 illustrates the potential 
future of litigation surrounding the Dodd-Frank Act.  While opponents of 
the Act were far more vigorous in the courts in the early days of 
implementation, supporters of the Act have adopted several of the same 
legal strategies to challenge the deregulatory administrative actions of the 
Trump Administration.  For example, in an echo of prior legal arguments, 
seven state attorneys general have sued to block the SEC’s recent 
rulemaking on Regulation Best Interest,252 claiming that the agency failed 
to follow the Dodd-Frank Act’s statutory mandate and that it was based 
on a flawed economic analysis.253  A decade into implementation, the 
Dodd-Frank Act continues to provide grist for the legal mill. 
IV.  LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ACTION 
The most important factor determining whether legislative 
activity around the Dodd-Frank Act for the past decade was successful 
has been divided government.  Except for a brief two-year period (2017–
2018), neither political party has controlled the House, Senate, and 
Presidency.  In addition, neither party during that time has held more than 
sixty seats in the Senate—the threshold necessary to invoke cloture and 
close off debate in the Senate.254  As a result, this has meant that 
opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act only have been able to make changes 
to the law if they can convince supporters of the law to join them, or by 
pursuing legislative strategies that involve the limited exceptions that 
avoid the cloture requirements in the Senate.   
While some of the legislative efforts to amend the Dodd-Frank 
Act described in this Part were unsuccessful, they provide important 
insight into the policy goals of the opponents of the Act.  In addition, 
 
 252. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33318 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 253. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, New York v. SEC, No. 1:19-cv-
08365 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also Dave Michaels, Seven States Sue SEC on Concern Broker 
Rule Is Weak, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2019, 11:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/seven-
states-sue-sec-on-concern-broker-rule-is-weak-11568085859 [https://perma.cc/UNZ3-
MVP3]. 
 254. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-425, INVOKING CLOTURE IN THE 
SENATE 1 (2017), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/be873e40-a966-4feb-9d72-
cf23a93cbe46.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ4C-WC39] (“Cloture is the only procedure by which 
the Senate can vote to set an end to a debate without also rejecting the bill, amendment, 
conference report, motion, or other matter it has been debating. . . .  The majority required to 
invoke cloture for most business is three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn, or 60 
votes if there are no vacancies in the Senate’s membership.”). 
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these unsuccessful efforts built a legislative foundation and contributed 
provisions to the limited number of legislative changes that ultimately 
passed.  It is, therefore, useful to consider these bills to provide context 
for the legislative changes to the Act that were ultimately enacted into 
law. 
A. The Financial CHOICE Act 
The Financial CHOICE255 Act (“CHOICE Act”)256 was first 
introduced in the 114th Congress by Representative Jeb Hensarling (R-
TX), the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.  
Although the bill passed the Committee on a partisan vote of thirty to 
twenty-six, the full House of Representatives never considered the bill.  
An amended version of the bill was introduced as H.R. 10 in the 115th 
Congress.257 
The CHOICE Act’s supporters argued that, if adopted, the more 
than 600-page bill  
 
replaces onerous government fiat with market discipline; 
substitutes bankruptcy for taxpayer-funded bailouts; 
throws a deregulatory life preserver to our community 
financial institutions; replaces complexity with 
simplicity; holds both Washington and Wall Street 
accountable; and unleashes capital formation so the 
economy can move yet again for the betterment of our 
citizens.258 
 
In furtherance of this expressed goal, the CHOICE Act would 
have repealed or amended almost every section of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 255. The acronym “CHOICE” stands for “Crea[ting] Hope and Opportunity for Investors, 
Consumers, and Entrepreneurs.”  See H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (“[An Act t]o create hope 
and opportunity for investors, consumers, and entrepreneurs by ending bailouts and Too Big 
to fail, holding Washington and Wall Street accountable, eliminating red tape to increase 
access to capital and credit, and repealing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that make 
America less prosperous, less stable, and less free, and for other purposes.”). 
 256. H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 257. H.R. 10.  The biggest change between the original version of the CHOICE Act and 
H.R. 10 was the removal of a provision that would have deleted the Durbin amendment to the 
Dodd-Frank Act (section 1075) that limits transaction fees imposed on merchants by debit 
card issuers.  This provision was highly contentious, and the provision was removed to attract 
additional Republican votes for the bill. 
 258. H.R REP. NO. 115-153, pt. 1, bk. 1, at 153 (2017) (accompanying H.R. 10). 
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had it been enacted into law.  Major sections of the Dodd-Frank Act that 
would have been affected include: 
 
• Repeal of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act which 
establishes orderly liquidation authority for the FDIC 
to resolve failing nonbank financial institutions.  The 
CHOICE Act also would have removed the FDIC 
from the review of “living wills,”259 and created a 
new section in Chapter 11 of the U. S. Bankruptcy 
Code with procedures for “liquidating, reorganizing 
or recapitalizing covered financial corporations.”260  
 
• Repeal the powers of FSOC to designate nonbank 
financial institutions as SIFIs.  It also would have 
canceled any existing designations, as well as 
repealed the Federal Reserve’s authority to supervise 
and set regulations for nonbank financial 
institutions.261 
 
• Exempt banks from risk-weighted capital ratios, 
liquidity requirements, enhanced prudential 
regulation (if the bank has more than $50 billion in 
assets), and other regulations if the bank opts to be 
subject to a 10% leverage ratio.262 
 
• Require financial regulatory agencies to include cost-
benefit analyses with all rulemakings and prohibit 
them from issuing a notice of final rulemaking if costs 
are greater than benefits without a joint resolution 
from Congress directing the agency to issue a notice 
of final rulemaking.263  It also would have required 
that Congress approve rules having an annual effect 
on the economy of $100 million or more.264 
 
 259. H.R. 10 § 111. 
 260. Id. § 122. 
 261. Id. § 151. 
 262. Id. §§ 601, 602. 
 263. Id. § 312. 
 264. Id. § 331. 
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• Place federal financial regulators under the 
congressional appropriations process.265 
• Replace the CFPB with the Consumer Law 
Enforcement Agency and change that agency’s 
powers, leadership, mandate, and funding.266  It also 
would have removed the agency’s examination and 
supervisory powers and made the Director removable 
at-will by the President.267 
 
• Repeal the Volcker Rule limitations on bank 
proprietary trading.268 
 
• Require an annual audit of the Federal Reserve and 
limit its emergency lending powers.269 
 
The bill also contained dozens of additional changes targeted at specific 
issues of concern to opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The CHOICE Act passed the House on June 8, 2017, with no 
Democrats voting in favor of the bill.  Without a sixty-vote margin in the 
Senate, and with strong opposition to the bill by the Democrats in the 
Senate, there was never any real prospect that the Senate would take it 
up.   
Turning to a different strategy, Chairman Hensarling began 
breaking off pieces of some of the less controversial provisions of the 
CHOICE Act in an attempt to garner support from some Democrats, 
offering them as individual bills in the Financial Services Committee and 
the House.  Focusing on provisions to benefit small banks and credit 
unions, and ostensibly to assist borrowers and investors, Hensarling was 
able to gain at least some Democratic support for many of the bills.  For 
example, in October 2017, the Financial Services Committee passed 
twenty-two bills—many by a bipartisan majority—including several that 
originated as provisions in the CHOICE Act.270  In January 2018, the 
 
 265. Id. §§ 361–65. 
 266. Id. §§ 711–37. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. § 901. 
 269. Id. §§ 1008, 1010. 
 270. Press Release from Republicans on the U.S. House of Representatives Fin. Servs. 
Comm., Committee Advances 22 Bills Forward for House Consideration (Oct. 12, 2017), 
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Committee passed fifteen individual bills, several with bipartisan 
support, and many of which were derived from provisions in the CHOICE 
Act or included provisions under consideration in financial reform 
legislation that was concurrently being negotiated in the Senate.271 
While continuing to push the CHOICE Act would have achieved 
very little legislatively, focusing on individual issues that had the 
potential to generate bipartisan support allowed Hensarling to show that 
the opponents of Dodd-Frank were willing to negotiate and accept less 
than their ultimate legislative desires.  It also was an attempt to keep the 
House relevant in the deregulatory debate that was progressing in the 
Senate.  
B. S. 2155 – The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2018 
S. 2155,272 the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”),273 which made the most 
significant legislative changes to the Dodd-Frank Act since its enactment, 
grew out of bipartisan negotiations in the Senate Banking Committee and 
the election year needs of several Democratic Senators.  Whether because 
of a desire to demonstrate that they could legislate in a bipartisan fashion 
or a need to demonstrate flexibility to potential campaign donors, several 
Senators who were up for reelection, many in states that had been carried 
in the 2016 election by President Trump, were primed to engage in 
discussions to amend the Dodd-Frank Act.  However, their intention was 
to keep the effort limited to popular provisions intended to assist 
community banks and local communities.  Initially four Democratic 
members of the Senate Banking Committee engaged in discussions with 




 271. Press Release from Republicans on the U.S. House of Representatives Fin. Servs. 
Comm., Committee Advances 15 Bills (Jan. 18, 2018), https://republicans-
financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=402932 
[https://perma.cc/GC5P-LWUC]. 
 272. S. 2155, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); accord Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, 
and Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”), Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
 273. EGRRCPA, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296. 
 274. Amanda Terkel, Arthur Delaney & Zach Carter, Behind the Scenes of the Bruising 
Bank Fight that Divided Senate Democrats, HUFFPOST (June 7, 2018, 2:41 PM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/senate-democrats-banking-
fight_n_5b188c89e4b09578259ed910 [https://perma.cc/WYK3-4S24]. 
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Following a few months of negotiations, the EGRRCPA was 
introduced as S. 2155 on November 16, 2017, with nine Democratic 
Senators and one Independent as cosponsors.275  The bill quickly passed 
the Senate Banking Committee a month later and passed the full Senate 
on March 14, 2018, by a vote of sixty-seven in favor and thirty-one 
against—far exceeding the sixty-vote threshold—with the concurrence of 
seventeen Democrats and Independents.  After a delay of several months 
where Chairman Hensarling sought to add additional provisions from the 
CHOICE Act and various House bills to the bill, S. 2155 passed the 
House by a bipartisan vote of 258 to 159 and was signed into law by 
President Trump on May 24, 2018.276 
Although the EGRRCPA, as enacted, was a far cry from the 
extensive rollback of the Dodd-Frank Act that many of its opponents had 
wanted, it nevertheless included several significant changes.  Among 
other things, the main provisions of EGRRCPA, as enacted, included the 
following: 
 
• Increases the asset threshold for automatic 
designations of banks as SIFIs to $250 billion from 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s $50 billion threshold.  This 
amendment reduced by more than half the number of 
banks with assets over $50 billion that would 
automatically be designated as SIFIs.  The Act also 
sets a $250 billion asset threshold for all Federal 
Reserve- and company-run tests, as well as permits 
changes in the test scenarios and reduces the 
frequency of self-conducted tests.277 
 
• Exempts banks with $10 billion or less in assets from 
the Volcker Rule.278 
 
• Creates a community bank leverage ratio279 for banks 
with less than $10 billion to simplify their capital 
 
 275. Non-Republican original cosponsors included Senators Donnelly, Heitkamp, Tester, 
Warner, McCaskill, Manchin, King, Kaine, Peters, and Bennet. 
 276. EGRRCPA, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296. 
 277. Id. § 401, 132 Stat. at 1356–59. 
 278. Id. § 203, 132 Stat. at 1309. 
 279. Id. § 201(a)(1), 132 Stat. at 1306 (“[T]he  ratio  of  the  tangible  equity  capital  of  a  
qualifying  community  bank,  as  reported  on the qualifying community bank’s applicable 
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compliance.280  The leverage ratio would be at least 
8% and no more than 10%.281 
 
• Relaxes the supplementary leverage ratio (“SLR”)282 
requirements established by the federal financial 
regulators under the enhanced capital requirements of 
the Dodd-Frank Act for banks that are 
“predominantly engaged in custody, safekeeping, and 
asset servicing activities.”283  Custodian bank funds 
that are deposited with the Fed or another central 
bank would not be counted as assets for the SLR 
calculation.284 
 
• Revises the liquidity coverage ratio285 rule that 
requires banks with at least $250 billion in assets, or 
$10 billion in on-balance-sheet foreign exposure, to 
hold a certain amount of high-quality liquid assets 
(“HQLA”)286 that can be easily sold during a crisis to 
 
regulatory filing with  the  qualifying  community  bank’s  appropriate  Federal  banking  
agency,  to  the  average  total  consolidated  assets  of  the  qualifying  community  bank,  as  
reported  on  the  qualifying  community  bank’s  applicable  regulatory  filing  with  the  
qualifying  community  bank’s  appropriate  Federal  banking  agency.”). 
 280. Id. § 201(c)(1)(A)–(B), 132 Stat. at 1307.  A bank that exceeds the ratio would be 
considered to have met: (1) generally applicable leverage and risk-based capital requirements 
under federal banking rules; and (2) banking regulatory standards for well-capitalized 
depository institutions.  Id. 
 281. Id. § 201(b)(1), 132 Stat. at 1306. 
 282. Regulatory capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage 
Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Insured 
Depository Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 24528, 24530 (May 1, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 
6, 208, 217 & 324) (“[A] non-risk-based measure of tier 1 capital relative to an exposure 
amount that includes both on- and off-balance sheet exposures.”). 
 283. EGRRCPA § 402(a), 132 Stat. at 1359. 
 284. Id. § 402(b)(2)(a), 132 Stat. at 1359–60. 
 285. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 
61439, 61443 (Oct. 10, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329) (“The final rule 
requires a covered company to maintain an amount of HQLA meeting the criteria set forth in 
this final rule (the HQLA amount, which is the numerator of the ratio) that is no less than 100 
percent of its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period (the 
denominator of the ratio).”). 
 286. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring, 
78 Fed. Reg. 71817, 71823 (Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329) 
(“Assets that would qualify as HQLA should be easily and immediately convertible into cash 
with little or no loss of value during a period of liquidity stress.”). 
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include a municipal security that is liquid, readily 
marketable, and investment-grade.287 
 
• Increases an asset cap from $1 billion to $3 billion 
under which well-capitalized and highly rated insured 
banks can receive an on-site regulatory examination 
every eighteen months instead of every twelve 
months.288 
 
• Allows banks with less than $5 billion in assets to 
submit abbreviated required financial reports to 
federal regulators every other quarter.  However, full 
reports would still be required for the remaining 
quarters.289 
 
• Allows a residential mortgage loan to qualify as a 
qualified mortgage290 if it is originated and held in 
portfolio for the duration of the loan by an insured 
depository institution or credit union that—together 
with its affiliates—has less than $10 billion in 
assets.291 
 
The EGRRCPA also included a number of additional provisions to reduce 
the regulatory burden regarding community banks, residential mortgage 
lending, and capital formation.  
The passage of the EGRRCPA left many hard feelings between 
Democrats who supported the bill and those who opposed it.  The 
presidential campaign of one of the bill’s strongest opponents, Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, published the names of Democrats who voted for the 
bill and said, “[w]e want everyone to know whose side their senators are 
standing on this week: the big banks or the American people.”292  
Democratic Senators supporting the bill issued a seven point rebuttal of 
 
 287. EGRRCPA § 403, 132 Stat. at 1360. 
 288. Id. § 210, 132 Stat. at 1316. 
 289. Id. § 205, 132 Stat. at 1310. 
 290. Id. § 101, 132 Stat. at 1297–98; accord 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A) (2018) (defining 
“qualified mortgage” as any residential mortgage where the consumer is presumed to have a 
reasonable ability to repay the loan). 
 291. EGRRCPA § 101, 132 Stat. at 1297–98. 
 292. Terkel, Delaney & Carter, supra note 274. 
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the “Fact versus Fiction” of the bill arguing that it was appropriately 
targeted to benefit Main Street and not Wall Street.293  The fact that a 
number of the Senators who supported the EGRRCPA lost in the 2018 
election294—despite their participation in the bipartisan effort to pass the 
bill—would not provide much encouragement for future bipartisan 
support for additional legislation to amend the Dodd-Frank Act.295 
The EGRRCPA was clearly the most significant legislative 
change to the Dodd-Frank Act.  Its sponsors were able to seize a brief 
window of time to pass a bill with limited reach that served the political 
needs of both sides of the aisle.  This differentiated it from prior 
legislative deregulation efforts which followed much more partisan 
legislative strategies with limited effect.   
Although the law was passed with bipartisan support, its 
implementation has been controversial.  House Financial Services 
Chairman Maxine Waters summed up the concerns of many supporters 
of the Dodd-Frank Act in stating that she is 
 
concerned that our banking regulators are following the 
dangerous deregulatory blueprint that the Trump 
Administration laid out in a series of Treasury reports, 
and checking off deregulatory items one by one.  For 
example, they have moved to weaken capital, stress 
testing, and other requirements for the largest financial 
institutions; taken action to weaken the Volcker rule, a 
rule which prevents banks from gambling with taxpayer 
dollars; and proposed weakening the swap margin rule, 
which would threaten our economic stability for a $40 
billion giveaway to Wall Street megabanks.  In rolling 
 
 293. Joint Statement from Senators Donnelly, Heitkamp, Tester & Warner, U.S. Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, FACT versus FICTION: Bipartisan regulatory 
relief helps Main Street and rural communities while staying tough on Wall Street, 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/download/12-4-myth-fact-on-fin-reg-reform-billheitkamp-
tester-donnelly-warnerdocx [https://perma.cc/B6KT-MZLQ]. 
 294. Democratic Senators who supported the bill and lost the election included Donnelly, 
Heitkamp, McCaskill, and Nelson.  Republican Senator Heller also supported the bill and lost 
his reelection bid. 
 295. Victoria Guida & Zachary Warmbrodt, Bank-Friendly Senate Democrats Fall in 
Midterms, in Blow to Industry, POLITICO (Nov. 7, 2018, 10:11 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/07/banking-financial-services-committees-see-
shakeup-in-blow-to-industry-2164813 [https://perma.cc/H2HW-H43W] (“After last night, it 
would be hard for Dem senators to think that cooperating with Republicans on financial policy 
is helpful to winning re-election.”). 
54 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 24 
back important reforms put in place in the [Dodd-Frank 
Act] to protect consumers, investors and the economy, 
regulators are opening the door to bad practices that 
contributed to the devastating financial crisis of 2008.296 
 
The Trump Administration has moved aggressively to implement the 
EGRRCPA.  In the eighteen months since its passage, the federal 
financial regulators have issued final rules for twelve provisions of the 
Act.297  These regulations include changes to the rules regarding the 
examination cycle, resolution plans, stress tests, capital ratios, and the 
Volcker Rule. 
Although Administration officials have contended that they are 
implementing the Act in a manner intended to “ensure our regulatory 
regime is not only simple, efficient, and transparent, but also coherent 
and effective,”298 supporters of the Dodd-Frank Act have questioned 
whether they are using the EGRRCPA as license to greatly expand the 
deregulatory impact of the enacted reforms.  For example, in commenting 
on the regulators’ proposed rule to amend the Volcker Rule, Paul Volcker 
wrote that, “[t]he new rule amplifies risk in the financial system, 
increases moral hazard and erodes protections against conflicts of interest 
that were so glaringly on display during the last crisis.”299  He went on to 
note: 
 
It bolsters the views of skeptics who believe that the 
“simplification” effort was merely a ploy to weaken the 
core elements of the reform.  It also serves as a reminder 
of the insidious nature of lobbying in regulation and 
 
 296. Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Waters Urges Regulators to Hold 
Depository Institutions Accountable (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=404887 
[https://perma.cc/AD88-AS76]. 
 297. Oversight of Prudential Regulators: Ensuring the Safety, Soundness, Diversity, and 
Accountability of Depository Institutions?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
116th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019) (statement of Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp.), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-wstate-
mcwilliamsj-20191204.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMJ8-YAJE]. 
 298. Statement Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs. on the Economic Growth, Regulatory 
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 116th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019) (statement of Randal K. 
Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/files/quarles20191204a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TP3B-DNZH]. 
 299. Letter from Paul Volcker to Chairman Jerome Powell (Aug. 20, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
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should trouble anyone concerned with the eroding public 
trust in government and the role of the Federal Reserve as 
the principle guardian of financial stability.300 
 
For their part, the Republican supporters of the EGRRCPA on the Senate 
Banking Committee continued to urge federal financial agencies to move 
forward rapidly with implementation,301 partially to avoid delayed 
rulemaking that would not be finalized within sixty legislative days of the 
end to the Congress and thus potentially subject to the future application 
of the Congressional Review Act depending on the outcome of the 2020 
elections.302 
C. Appropriations 
Appropriations bills are one of the favored ways for Members of 
Congress to attempt to pass legislation that they otherwise can not pass 
through the normal legislative process.  Congress must pass legislation 
each year to fund government programs, thus providing annual 
opportunities for making legislative changes.  Although the Rules of the 
House of Representatives303 and of the Senate304 generally prohibit 
legislating on an appropriations bill, it is nevertheless a fairly common 
practice.  Like their legislative brethren, appropriations bills in the Senate 
still must by rule meet a sixty-vote threshold to limit debate,305 so their 
utility as legislative vehicles is limited for controversial legislation. 
Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, opponents of the Act 
have sought to use the appropriations process to alter its provisions with 
limited success.  Nevertheless, the appropriations process did result in 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Letter from Republican Members of the U.S. Senate Banking Comm. to Jerome H. 
Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Joseph M. Otting, Comptroller, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp. (July 30, 2019), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Powell%20Otting%20McWilliams%20Lett
er%207-30-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U5F-ZLXJ]. 
 302. For a deeper discussion of the Congressional Review Act, see infra Part IV.F of this 
Article. 
 303. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XXI, cl. 2, at 35 (116th Cong., 2019), 
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/116-1/116-House-Rules-
Clerk.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNF7-XWGL]. 
 304. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, R. XVI, at 11–12 (2013), 
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3ZS-
N6DB] (GPO edition). 
 305. Id. at R. XXII, at 15–17. 
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one significant change to the Dodd-Frank Act.  Section 716 of the Act,306 
known as the “swaps pushout rule,” prohibited federal assistance 
(including access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window and deposit 
insurance) to banks that engaged in certain swap activities.  As a result, 
banks were required to move such activities outside the bank to separately 
capitalized nonbank affiliates.  The provision had been controversial 
since it was originally proposed during consideration of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.307   
The large banks that were most affected by the swaps pushout 
rule disliked the provision, arguing that it was costly and difficult to 
implement.  They had spent several years trying to amend or repeal the 
Act.  Working behind the scenes to change the language, the large banks 
had enlisted some regional banks in the effort to amend the law.  In 2013, 
a bill to amend the swaps pushout rule308 passed the House by a vote of 
292 to 122, with seventy Democrats voting in support.  The passage of 
the bill was the subject of some controversy when it was revealed that 
most of the bill was based on language that had been drafted by lobbyists 
for the large banks.309  The bill did not repeal the swaps pushout rule, but 
permitted banks to retain certain types of swap activities within the bank, 
requiring that far fewer activities be pushed out of the bank.  Although 
the bill had passed the House with the support of seventy Democrats, the 
Senate did not take it up. 
In 2014, similar language was added the Financial Services and 
General Government Appropriations bill.310  Late in that year, Congress 
and the Obama Administration reached an agreement and passed 
legislation that was signed into law to fund the government for the 
coming fiscal year through a last-minute omnibus appropriations bill that 
 
 306. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
716, 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2018). 
 307. Dave Clarke, Kate Davidson & John Prior, How Wall St. Got Its Way: Liberals Fight 
Back, But can’t Stop, Bonanza for Banks., POLITICO (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:40 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/wall-street-spending-bill-congress-113525 
[https://perma.cc/JB5D-YXNV]. 
 308. Swaps Regulatory Improvement Act, H.R. 992, 113th Cong. (2013); see Dodd-Frank 
§ 716, 15 U.S.C. § 8305. 
 309. Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial Bills, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 23, 2013, 9:44 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/banks-lobbyists-
help-in-drafting-financial-bills/ [https://perma.cc/X95C-K8TF] (“Citigroup’s 
recommendations were reflected in more than 70 lines of the House Committee’s 85-line 
bill.”). 
 310. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 5016, 113th 
Cong. (2014). 
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included language to amend the swaps pushout rule.311  The language 
caused an uproar among the Dodd-Frank Act’s strongest supporters.312  
Not only were they concerned about the substance of the legislation, they 
also were concerned that the precedent of attaching changes to the Dodd-
Frank Act in must-pass funding bills would provide a roadmap to future 
legislative changes.313  However, the uproar surrounding the efforts to 
change the Act through this process generated so much public attention 
and negative publicity that the heightened vigilance of the Dodd-Frank 
Act supporters in subsequent appropriations bills ensured that no other 
significant changes to the Act would be made successfully through this 
process going forward.   
For example, the Fiscal Year 2018 (“FY18”) Financial Services 
and General Government Appropriations bill,314 as introduced, included 
numerous provisions from the Financial CHOICE Act, including: (a) 
repealing the FSOC’s ability to designate nonbank financial institutions 
as SIFIs;315 (b) altering the membership, proceedings and duties of the 
FSOC;316 (c) making all of the federal financial regulators subject to 
appropriations;317 (d) repealing the Volcker Rule;318 (e) altering the living 
will process;319 (f) eliminating the CFPB’s authority to supervise and 
examine financial institutions;320 and (g) eliminating the enforcement 
authority of the CFPB with regard to payday loans.321  In addition, the 
bill included a new Chapter 14 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code regarding 
the failure of large complex financial institutions.322  Yet, none of these 
provisions survived the appropriations process, nor were they enacted 
into law. 
 
 311. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat. 2130 (2014). 
 312. Lipton & Protess, supra note 309. 
 313. Id. (“This is a road map for stealth unwinding of financial reform.” (quoting 
Representative Barney Frank)). 
 314. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 3280, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
 315. See id. § 903. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See id. §§ 904–08. 
 318. See id. § 933. 
 319. See id. § 903. 
 320. See id. § 927. 
 321. See id. § 928. 
 322. See id. § 1001. 
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D. Budget Reconciliation 
In 2017, with Republicans in control of the House, Senate, and 
Presidency, but with a Senate majority still below the sixty-vote threshold 
to cut off debate, opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act looked for legislative 
actions that they could take with a simple majority vote in the Senate.  A 
process known as budget reconciliation provided just such an 
opportunity.   
Under the Congressional Budget Act,323 the Congress annually 
adopts a budget resolution setting out the budgetary goals for the coming 
fiscal year.  The budget resolution is not signed by the President and 
therefore does not carry the force of law.  To meet the budgetary goals, 
Congress often must pass separate legislation “to reconcile existing law 
with its current priorities.”324  “Reconciliation” provides an expedited 
procedure for considering legislation to bring existing spending and 
revenue laws into compliance with the new budget.325 
Congress first adopts a budget resolution that includes 
reconciliation instructions which instruct relevant authorizing 
committees to develop and report legislation that will achieve the budget 
goals of the budget resolution.326  The relevant committees develop and 
report legislation that meets their assigned targets of spending reductions 
or revenue increases.  The committees then report their legislative 
recommendations to the Budget Committee which packages them into a 
reconciliation bill for consideration by the House and Senate.327  In the 
Senate, reconciliation bills are privileged and it is generally “unnecessary 
to invoke cloture in order to reach a final vote on a reconciliation bill in 
the Senate.”328  Thus, if legislation will reduce spending or increase 
revenues through reconciliation, it is possible for a simple majority in 
both the House and the Senate to move legislation to the President.  
During times of unified government, this allows the majorities in the 
 
 323. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 
(1974). 
 324. MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS: STAGES OF CONSIDERATION 1 (2017), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44058 [https://perma.cc/RV82-2BW8]. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 2. 
 327. Id. at 5. 
 328. Id. at 8. 
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House and Senate and the President to enact laws under expedited 
procedures with no minority support. 
Prior to passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC only had 
authority to manage the failure of banks, but not their holding companies 
or other nonbank entities.329  Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act gave the 
FDIC orderly liquidation authority (“OLA”) to manage the failures of 
bank holding companies and other financial institutions that had been 
designated as SIFIs.330  The FDIC is empowered to borrow from the 
Treasury to fund these resolutions331 and to recapture any costs from 
remaining bank holding companies and SIFIs at no cost to the 
taxpayer.332 
Critics of OLA have argued that Title II effectively enshrines 
“Too Big to Fail” by using government resources to manage the 
resolution of these institutions rather than having them go through 
bankruptcy as in the case of the failure of Lehman Brothers.333  
Supporters of OLA argue that the inability to manage the failures of large, 
complex financial institutions actually results in “Too Big to Fail” as the 
government has limited options for managing their failure other than 
providing financial support.334  Under OLA, if an institution fails, its 
management is replaced, and its assets are liquidated.335 
 
 329. Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, 
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.), republished in Speeches & Testimony, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. (July 23, 2009), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2009/spjuly2309.html 
[https://perma.cc/925A-N2NA]. 
 330. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
204, 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a) (2018). 
 331. Id. § 210, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2018). 
 332. Id. § 214, 12 U.S.C. § 5394 (2018). 
 333. REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE H. FIN. SERVS. COMM., 113TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON 
FAILING TO END “TOO BIG TO FAIL”: AN ASSESSMENT FOR THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR YEARS 
LATER 1, passim (July 2014), 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Other/House_Republications_071814_tbtf_repo
rt_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D67Y-RDXJ] (“[The report] concludes that not only did the 
Dodd-Frank Act not end ‘too big to fail,’ it had the opposite effect of further entrenching it as 
official government policy.”). 
 334. Erika Eichelberger, The House GOP’s Hypocrisy on “Too-Big-To-Fail”, MOTHER 
JONES (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/11/house-republicans-
too-big-to-fail/ [https://perma.cc/AE4S-BMBD] (“The GOP-controlled House, meanwhile, 
has passed legislation making it more likely that failing banks will get government handouts, 
and attempted to defund measures that would help the government wind down failing 
banks.”). 
 335. Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., A Progress Report on the 
Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (May 12, 2015) (speaking to the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C.), reprinted in Speeches & 
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Although OLA is designed to recover any costs incurred in the 
resolution of a large, complex financial institution from assessments on 
the financial industry,336 the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) has 
“scored” OLA as increasing the deficit by approximately $15 billion 
under congressional budget rules.337  In preparing its estimate, CBO 
recognized: 
 
Although the probability that the FDIC will have 
to liquidate a systemically important firm in any year is 
small, the potential cash flows associated with resolving 
them would likely be large.  CBO’s baseline projections 
reflect the estimated probability of various scenarios 
regarding the frequency and magnitude of systemic 
financial problems.338   
 
CBO also recognized that “the FDIC would eventually recover the cost 
of any additional losses by raising assessments on insured deposits; 
however, CBO estimates that such recoveries would occur over many 
years.”339  “The true cost to taxpayers from OLA is zero, although over 
an arbitrary ten-year period it may be counted as having a cost.  Thus, if 
OLA is counted as increasing the deficit over a ten-year period, repealing 
OLA is counted as reducing the deficit.”340 
Based on the CBO score, repeal of OLA under Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act would result in deficit reduction of $15 billion.341  This 
budget “savings” made the repeal of OLA a very attractive target for its 
opponents.  By including repeal of OLA in the reconciliation bill, they 
 
Testimony, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2015/spmay1215.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y7RM-7Q75] (last updated May 13, 2015). 
 336. Dodd-Frank § 214, 12 U.S.C. § 5394(b). 
 337. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE OF H.R. 4894: A BILL TO REPEAL TITLE II OF 
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 3 (2016) 
[hereinafter CBO COST ESTIMATE OF H.R. 4894], 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/costestimate/hr4894.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GU6D-9XCM]. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 4. 
 340. Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, BROOKINGS 
(June 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-dodd-
franks-orderly-liquidation-authority/ [https://perma.cc/PJR8-59A3]. 
 341. CBO COST ESTIMATE OF H.R. 4894, supra note 337, at 5. 
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could achieve a very substantial savings under the budget rules and 
achieve a major legislative goal at the same time.   
Previous efforts by opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act to repeal 
OLA had been unsuccessful in a world of divided government with no 
support by Democrats in the Senate,342 so reconciliation was frequently 
considered as a way to amend OLA.343  In the end, however, OLA was 
not included in the reconciliation bills during the two years of Republican 
control of the House and Senate from 2017 to 2018.  Instead, the 
Republican leadership chose to use reconciliation as the legislative 
vehicle for other high-profile, controversial legislation, such as the 
unsuccessful attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act and the successful 
effort to enact the Trump Administration’s tax cuts.344  When Democrats 
retook the House in 2018, reconciliation ceased being a viable legislative 
alternative to repeal OLA for the time being. 
E. Bankruptcy Code 
As detailed above, opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act sought to 
repeal OLA through the CHOICE Act and reconciliation.  However, 
simply repealing OLA begged the question of how to handle the failure 
of large, complex financial institutions when the bankruptcy process 
failed so completely during the financial crisis.  To address this issue, 
opponents proposed amending the U.S. Bankruptcy Code345 to address 
the failure of large financial institutions.346 
 
 342. Andrew Leonard, Sabotage: The New GOP Plan, SALON (May 4, 2012, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2012/05/04/sabotage_the_new_gop_plan/ [https://perma.cc/V9U8-
QQYX]. 
 343. Norbert Michel, Budget Reconciliation: A Viable Path for CHOICE Act Reforms, 
FORBES (Sept. 4, 2017, 10:26 PM), 
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 344. Ryan Rainey, GOP Lawmakers Weighing Whether to Use Tax Bill to Dismantle 
Dodd-Frank, MORNING CONSULT: FIN. REG. (Sept. 28, 2017, 5:14 PM), 
https://morningconsult.com/2017/09/28/gop-lawmakers-weighing-whether-use-tax-bill-
dismantle-dodd-frank/ [https://perma.cc/MWH8-QUGE]. 
 345. See S. 1861, 113th Congress (2013) (illustrating legislation introduced by Senators 
Cornyn and Toomey to create a new Chapter 14 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); H.R. 5421, 
113th Cong. (2014) (proposing to add a new subchapter V to Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code). 
 346. See S. 1861; H.R. 5421. 
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The Dodd-Frank Act contemplates bankruptcy as the first option 
in the case of a large systemic financial institution.347  Before triggering 
the OLA,348 the Act requires a determination by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, based on a recommendation from super majorities of the 
Boards of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC,349 that a resolution of the 
firm under any other federal law, such as bankruptcy, “would have 
serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.”350  
Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires certain defined financial 
institutions to provide resolution plans for the rapid and orderly resolution 
of the institutions in the event of material financial distress or failure to 
facilitate a resolution either in bankruptcy or under OLA.351  These plans 
are required to be submitted to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC for 
review.352 
Once OLA is triggered, the FDIC is granted powers and 
authorities similar to those it has historically exercised to manage the 
failure of a bank, including the authority to establish bridge companies 
and transfer assets.353  To clarify how it would exercise those powers and 
authorities in the context of OLA, the FDIC published a plan, called the 
single point of entry (“SPOE”) strategy, describing how it would manage 
the failure of a systemic institution.354 
Opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act and OLA in the House 
introduced legislation, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act 
(“FIBA”),355 to add a new subchapter V to Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code and to address the special circumstances of the failure 
 
 347. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
203(a)(2)(F), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(2)(F) (2018). 
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 350. Id. § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2). 
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 352. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (d)(1). 
 353. 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2018); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2018). 
 354. Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of 
Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614 (Dec. 18, 2013) (notice and request for comments). 
 355. H.R. 5421, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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of a large, complex financial institution.  FIBA would authorize 
bankruptcy courts to operate over forty-eight hours to move the original 
firm’s operations to a new bridge company and all operating subsidiaries 
would remain outside of the bankruptcy.  The bridge company would be 
recapitalized by leaving behind long-term, unsecured debt to absorb the 
losses of the firm.  Derivatives contracts would be stayed, and the 
proceedings would be overseen by a federal bankruptcy judge.   
A similar bill, the Taxpayer Protection and Responsible 
Resolution Act,356 was introduced in the Senate but took the additional 
step of repealing OLA.  Interestingly, both bills essentially codified the 
SPOE strategy that the FDIC had developed in bankruptcy for systemic 
financial institutions.  However, neither addressed the issues of funding, 
international cooperation, and preplanning that were so important to the 
SPOE strategy. 
FIBA passed the House by voice vote in the 113th, 114th, and 
115th Sessions of Congress.  During debate, Democrats supported the 
legislation as a complement to OLA in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
They noted that the bill would improve the bankruptcy process and 
increase the chances that Title II would not need to be invoked in an 
emergency.  They also made clear that their support was contingent on 
the bill not repealing Title II OLA.357 
The concept of bankruptcy reform as a complement to Title II of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, rather than a replacement, has gained momentum 
over time.  In a July 2015 hearing on the Taxpayer Protection and 
Responsible Resolution Act,358 none of the witnesses called to support 
the bill were willing to support the repeal of Title II and most viewed it 
as an important backstop.359  In April 2017, President Trump issued a 
memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury directing him to “examine 
. . . OLA . . . to propose recommendations for reform of OLA guided by 
 
 356. S. 1861, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 357. CONG. REC. H8178 (dailey ed. Dec. 1, 2014) (statement of Representative Conyers), 
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 358. S. 1861, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 359. The Role of Bankruptcy Reform in Addressing Too Big to Fail: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot., S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 
114th Cong. 18–20 (2015) (statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of 
Entrepreneurship, MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt.), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
114shrg97650/pdf/CHRG-114shrg97650.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q5C-ULWC]. 
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the Core Principles[360] and to examine whether a new chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code should be adopted for the resolution of financial 
companies.”361  Following the examination of OLA, the Treasury 
recommended revisions to it and “retaining OLA as an emergency tool 
for use under only extraordinary circumstances.”362  Treasury went on to 
state:  
 
While bankruptcy must be the presumptive option, the 
bankruptcy of large, complex financial institutions may 
not be feasible in some circumstances, including when 
there is insufficient private financing.  In those cases, a 
reformed OLA process—with predictable, clear 
allocation of losses to shareholders and creditors—is a far 
preferable alternative to destabilizing financial contagion 
or ad hoc government bailouts.363 
 
With this determination by the Treasury Department, it seems 
unlikely that Congress will repeal OLA in the near future.  However, it is 
important to note that, even with strong bipartisan support, Congress has 
not yet passed legislation to improve the ability of the bankruptcy system 
to handle the failure of systemically significant institutions even thougth 
the Dodd-Frank Act retains this as the first option. 
F. Congressional Review Act 
The Congressional Review Act (“CRA”)364 is a law that 
previously only had been used one time between its passage in 1994 and 
2017.  As the name suggests, the law establishes a mechanism for 
Congress to review certain agency rules before they become effective.365  
 
 360. Exec. Order No. 13722, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017); see infra Part V 
(excerpting Core Principles). 
 361. Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump on Orderly Liquidation Authority for 
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201700266/pdf/DCPD-201700266.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG7T-6VFS]. 
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LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM 2 (2018), 
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 365. See supra Part III.A (discussing CRA). 
2020] DISMANTLING DODD-FRANK 65 
Congress had previously sought to exercise a review over agency 
rulemaking through the mechanism of the “legislative veto” which was 
invalidated by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional.366 
Under the CRA, agencies must submit final rules to Congress and 
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) for review.367  In the 
case of “major rules,” defined as those rules that have an annual impact 
on the economy of more than $100 million,368 the rules do not take effect 
until sixty legislative days after the report is submitted.369  Non-major 
rules take effect as otherwise provided by law upon submission to 
Congress.370  The class of rules covered by the CRA is broader than the 
definition of rules under the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, 
and provides that “some agency actions, such as guidance documents, 
that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may 
still be considered rules under the CRA.”371 
In the case of major rules, once the rule is submitted, the rule 
takes effect on the later of (a) sixty legislative days after submission to 
Congress, or (b) publication in the Federal Register unless Congress 
passes and the President signs a joint resolution of disapproval.372  The 
joint resolution is considered under expedited procedures and is not 
subject to the sixty-vote cloture requirement in the Senate.373  If the rule 
was submitted within sixty legislative days of adjournment, the new 
Congress may consider the resolution of disapproval.374  If Congress 
adopts and the President signs a resolution of disapproval, a rule 
 
may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and a 
new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may 
not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is 
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 371. VALERIE C. BRANNON & MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45248, THE 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: DETERMINING WHICH “RULES” MUST BE SUBMITTED TO 
CONGRESS 1 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45248 
[https://perma.cc/92YH-BYVP]. 
 372. CRA § 251, 5 U.S.C § 801(b). 
 373. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 802(d) (2018). 
 374. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(d). 
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specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of 
the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.375 
 
While the effectiveness of the CRA is limited by time and 
circumstance, a change in administration combined with unified 
government can make it highly effective.  Once the Republicans gained 
control of the House, the Senate, and the Presidency in early 2017, they 
were able to use the CRA to some effect against regulations issued under 
the Dodd-Frank Act.376  With the availability of this tool, opponents of 
the Dodd-Frank Act moved quickly to target the handful of rules that fit 
the criteria of the CRA.   
The SEC’s extractive minerals rule discussed in Part II of this 
Article377 was the first rule to be targeted with the CRA.378  The long 
court battles around rulemaking to implement section 1504 of the Dodd-
Frank Act379 had delayed the rulemaking to the point that it fit within the 
CRA timeframe of sixty legislative days.380  Following passage in the 
House and the Senate, the President signed the joint resolution of 
disapproval into law on February 14, 2017, blocking the SEC rule 
proposed under section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act.381  With the 
statutory requirement for rulemaking under section 1504 still in place, the 
SEC recently proposed a rule382 that includs several changes from the 
congressionally disapproved 2016 rule.383  The SEC made these changes 
to promulgate the statutorily-required rule while at the same time 
 
 375. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). 
 376. Amber Phillips, Why Republicans’ 100-Day War on Obama is About to End, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 25, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/04/25/why-republicans-100-day-war-on-obama-is-about-to-end/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z3AJ-TZVF]. 
 377. See supra Part II. 
 378. Steven Mufson, Trump Signs Law Rolling Back Disclosure Rule for Energy and 




 379. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2018). 
 380. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 381. Pub. L. No. 115-4, 115th Cong., 131 Stat. 9 (2017). 
 382. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extration Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522 (proposed 
Jan. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). 
 383. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49360 (July 27, 
2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). 
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complying with the CRA’s requirement that any new rule not be 
“substantially the same”384 as the rule that had been disapproved.385 
In the area of financial regulations, Congress next used the CRA 
to invalidate a CFPB rule on arbitration agreements.386  The rule in 
question had been promulgated pursuant to section 1028(b) of the Dodd-
Frank Act,387 which allows the CFPB to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in the consumer finance arena.  In that case, rather than 
looking back to a rule from a prior administration, Congress 
contemporaneously invalidated a rule promulgated by an independent 
financial regulator with a holdover Director.   
The third instance of opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act using the 
CRA illustrated a new, more-expansive application of the CRA.388  In 
that case, Congress invalidated guidance issued by the CFPB on indirect 
auto lending that had been issued in 2013.389  Congressional action on the 
five-year-old guidance was possible because, as described above, the 
CRA uses the APA definition of “rule” which includes agency actions 
beyond those that require APA rulemaking.390  While the APA provides 
that notice-and-comment rulemaking is not required for interpretative 
rules or general statements of policy, they still fall under the definition of 
“rules” under the CRA.391 
In addition, the “rule” could be reviewed five years after it was 
issued because, over time, a body of practice has evolved where Congress 
can request that the GAO opine on whether a particular agency action 
 
 384. Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2018). 
 385. Id. 
 386. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 1040). 
 387. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2018). 
 388. Joe Adler & Neil Haggerty, Does Senate’s Repeal of CFPB Policy Put All Guidance 
In Crosshairs?, AM. BANKER (Apr. 18, 2018, 3:37 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/does-senates-repeal-of-cfpb-policy-put-all-
guidance-in-crosshairs [https://perma.cc/89G6-M2YM]. 
 389. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-02, INDIRECT AUTO 
LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 1–5 (2013) 
[hereinafter CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-02], 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RWY7-5EBQ]; see also Adler & Haggerty, supra note 388 (noting Senate’s 
repeal of CFPB’s guidance on auto loans and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act). 
 390. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) § 551(4), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2018). 
 391. BRANNON & CAREY, supra note 371, at 12. 
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qualifies as a rule under the CRA.392  If the GAO determines393 that the 
action was a rule and if the rule had not been submitted to Congress and 
the GAO for review, the sixty-day clock starts from the date the GAO 
communicates its interpretation to Congress.394  Thus, in that case, 
Congress was able to reach back to a 2013 interpretive bulletin395 and 
invalidate it where it had not been submitted previously to Congress 
because the agency did not believe it was a rule requiring submission 
under the CRA.396 
The expansive reach of the CRA was also demonstrated in two 
recent opinions of the GAO, providing that three issuances of guidance 
by the Federal Reserve, going back several years, constituted “rules” 
under the CRA and would need to be submitted to Congress.397  In the 
first case, the GAO determined that Supervision and Regulation letters 
issued by the Federal Reserve regarding a framework for large bank 
supervision and actions banks should take for recovery planning that were 
issued in 2012 and 2014 were rules.398  In the second case, the GAO 
determined that the Federal Reserve’s 2011 guidance on model risk 
management was also a rule under the CRA.399   
 
 392. Id. at 21–23. 
 393. The GAO’s determination is likely determinative because 5 U.S.C. § 805 states that 
“[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial 
review.”  Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2018). 
 394. BRANNON & CAREY, supra note 371, at 24–27. 
 395. See CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-02, supra note 389, at 1–5. 
 396. See Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, to Senator Patrick J. Toomey 3 (Dec. 5, 2017) (B-329129), 
https://www.toomey.senate.gov/files/documents/GAO%20Lending.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DHJ5-XLFH] (“CFPB did not send a report on the Bulletin to Congress or 
the Comptroller General because, as stated in their letter to our Office, in their opinion the 
Bulletin is not a rule under CRA.”). 
 397. See Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, to Congressional Requestors 1–13 (Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter GAO Letter to 
Congressional Requesters], https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/7B65B068-8AD1-
4013-8FFA-1CA11B108428 [https://perma.cc/TC2N-VJWY] (discussing congressional 
request for GAO’s legal opinion regarding applicability of the CRA to supervision and 
regulation letters, specifically, three issued by the Federal Reserve); see also Letter from 
Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to Senator Thom R. 
Tillis 1–7 (Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter GAO Letter to Senator Thom R. Tillis], 
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/7B65B068-8AD1-4013-8FFA-1CA11B108428 
[https://perma.cc/LE9V-JCJ6] (discussing congressional request for GAO’s legal opinion 
regarding applicability of the CRA to supervision and regulation letter 11-7 issued by the 
Federal Reserve). 
 398. GAO Letter to Congressional Requesters, supra note 397, at 1–13. 
 399. GAO Letter to Senator Thom R. Tillis, supra note 397, at 1–7. 
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With Democrats in control of the House in 2019 and the CRA 
window effectively closed for now, the sixty legislative day clock expired 
without a successful congressional challenge to these particular guidance 
documents.  However, the full impact of this expansive interpretation of 
the CRA remains to be seen.  While agencies generally appear to 
regularly submit rules to Congress and the GAO that have been through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, any rules that have not been submitted 
may be at risk of congressional disapproval at some future date unless 
agencies retroactively submit them.  Yet, the application of the CRA to 
guidance, FAQs, press releases, and other agency actions may not be that 
impactful, as agencies generally do not view those actions as having the 
force of law.  Nevertheless, under such an expansive interpretation of the 
CRA, Congress eventually could find itself inundated with thousands of 
agency actions if agencies decided that it was to their benefit to submit 
all agency pronouncements out of an abundance of caution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The decade-long effort to dismantle Dodd-Frank has been 
impressive in its scope, patience, and creativity.  Opponents of the Act 
have marshalled every tool available to them and acted aggressively when 
presented with opportunities.  The fallout from the litigation battles has 
had a profound effect on many unrelated areas of government, including 
recess appointments, ALJ appointments, and agency rulemaking.  Yet, 
the significant resources expended and the results achieved (or not 
achieved) warrant a few additional observations. 
First, the effort expended in so many different arenas in attacking 
the Dodd-Frank Act created something of a multiplier effect.  For 
example, congressional letters and hearings elicit responses that provide 
fodder for judicial decisions,400 which in turn generate additional 
congressional hearings, document requests and letters This creates a 
closed loop of constant attacks on the Dodd-Frank Act.  With each attack 
building on prior attacks, opponents have been able to delay and alter 
implementation.  These delays often extended until a new line of attack 
presented itself. 
 
 400. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 146–147 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Henderson, J., 
dissenting) (citing numerous instances of testimony and responses to congressional inquiries 
and restating congressional criticisms of the CFPB). 
70 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 24 
Second, observing the mixed results of the extensive lobbying, 
litigation, and legislative strategies that have been employed over the past 
decade, none of them seem to have been as consequential as the 
opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act simply winning elections and replacing 
financial agency leadership with like-minded leadership.  Shortly after 
being sworn in, President Trump issued Executive Order 13772401 which 
required regulators to “regulate the [U.S.] financial system in a manner 
consistent with”402 the following Core Principles: 
 
(a) empower Americans to make independent 
financial decisions and informed choices in the 
marketplace, save for retirement, and build 
individual wealth; 
 
(b) prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts;  
 
(c) foster economic growth and vibrant financial 
markets through more rigorous regulatory impact 
analysis that addresses systemic risk and market 
failures, such as moral hazard and information 
asymmetry;  
 
(d) enable American companies to be competitive 
with foreign firms in domestic and foreign 
markets; 
 
(e) advance American interests in international 
financial regulatory negotiations and meetings; 
 
(f) make regulation efficient, effective, and 
appropriately tailored; and  
 
(g) restore public accountability within Federal 
financial regulatory agencies and rationalize the 
Federal financial regulatory framework.403 
 
 
 401. Exec. Order No. 13722, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 402. Id. at 9965. 
 403. Id. 
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Following these Core Principles, a new full complement of 
confirmed agency heads of the federal financial regulators have acted to 
materially change supervisory requirements for systemic institutions,404 
and the supervision of large banks.405  At the CFPB, the impact of the 
appointment of a new Director was especially pronounced.  In 
documenting the changes to the CFPB under Acting Director Mick 
Mulvaney, one reporter found: 
 
Over the last year, Mulvaney’s temporary hiring freeze 
has turned into an indefinite one, slowly shrinking the 
[CFPB’s] staff by attrition.  Bureau news releases, once 
packed with colorful details about abusive lending 
practices, have been toned down to dry legalese. . . .  In 
2018, the bureau announced just 11 lawsuits or 
settlements, less than a third of the number during 
Cordray’s last year.  In the months since Mulvaney 
reorganized the Office of Fair Lending, the bureau has not 
brought a single case alleging illegal discrimination.  
While Mulvaney pledged data-driven enforcement, his 
bureau brought only one case against debt collectors, who 
account for more complaints to the [CFPB] than almost 
any other industry.  Where Mulvaney or his successor 
have allowed cases to go forward, lenders have often 
settled with lowered fines or none at all.  When the bureau 
settled a three-year prosecution of a group of payday 
lenders called NDG Enterprise — which found that the 
 
 404. Comment Letter from former Sec’ys of the U.S. Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner & 
Jacob J. Lew, and former Chairs of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Ben S. 
Bernanke & Janet L. Yellen, concerning Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of 
Certain Nonbank Financial Companies (RIN 4030-ZA00), to Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, and Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. 
Sys., https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/887-bernanke-geithner-lew-yellen-
letter/a22621b202dfcb0fe06e/optimized/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8NX-MKRW] (“[The 
proposed guidance] would be contrary to the statutory framework, and would lead the FSOC 
to adopt a standard that is unworkable – effectively neutering this authority.”). 
 405. Danile K. Tarullo, former Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Remarks 
at the Americans for Financial Reform Conference on Big Bank Regulation Under the Trump 
Administration, Washington, D.C.: Taking the Stress Out of Stress Testing, at 3 (May 21, 
2019), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Tarullo-AFR-Talk.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9BUC-MJGF] (“Unfortunately, I fear that a good bit of that progress to 
which I referred a moment ago could be endangered by a kind of low-intensity deregulation, 
consisting of an accumulation of non-headline-grabbing changes and an opaque relaxation of 
supervisory rigor.”). 
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group had falsely threatened American customers with 
arrest and imprisonment if they failed to repay loans — 
NDG walked away without paying a cent.406 
 
In the words of an aphorism popular during the Reagan Administration, 
“personnel is policy.” 
Finally, it is clear that after a decade of conflict, the final battles 
over the Dodd-Frank Act have yet to be fought.  Deregulation under the 
APA must be achieved through and meet the same standards as new 
regulation.407  It remains to be seen if the supporters of the Act will muster 
the same level of energy and creativity to repel the deregulatory efforts 
to roll back the Dodd-Frank Act408 as their opponents have already shown 
and whether the opponents of the Act will hold themselves or be held to 
the same standards for dismantling the Dodd-Frank Act as supporters 
were for implementation. 
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